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JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD* 
ABSTRACT 
 Property is the law of lists and ledgers. County land records, stock 
certificate entries, mortgage registries, Uniform Commercial Code filings 
on personal property, copyright and patent registries of interests in 
intellectual property, bank accounts, domain name systems, and 
consumers’ Kindle e-book collections in the cloud are all merely entries in 
a list, determining who owns what. 
Each such list has suffered a traditional limitation. To prevent 
falsification or duplication, a single entity must maintain the list, and users 
must trust (and pay) that entity. As a result, transactions must proceed at 
significant expense and delay. Yet zero or near-zero transaction costs are 
the fuel of Internet scalability. Property transactions have not yet truly 
undergone an Internet revolution at least partly because they are 
constrained by the cost of creating centralized trusted authorities. 
This Article reimagines the contours of digital property if that central 
constraint were removed. There is every reason to believe it can be. 
Increased interest in cryptocurrencies has driven the development of a 
series of technologies for creating public, cryptographically secure ledgers 
of property interests that do not rely on trust in a specific entity to curate 
the list. Previously, the digital objects that users could buy and sell online 
were not rivalrous in the same way as offline physical objects, unless some 
centralized entity such as a social network, digital currency issuer, or game 
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company served the function of trusted list curator. Trustless public ledgers 
change this dynamic. Counterparties can hand one another digital, 
rivalrous objects in the same way that they used to hand each other gold 
bars or dollar bills. No intermediary or curator is needed. 
In addition, the advent of this technology provides an opportunity to 
discuss property interests in information environments. Property online is 
currently anemic. Consumers control few online resources and own even 
fewer. This is in no small part due to antiquated notions of property as the 
law of physical, tangible resources. Given new technology that can create 
digital, scarce, and rival intangible assets, these basic assumptions should 
be reexamined and replaced with a theory of property as an information 
communication and storage system. That is the project of this piece. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Property is the law of lists and ledgers. The vast bulk of owned wealth 
is recorded in systems that tell users who owns what.1 County courthouse 
land records, Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) security interest filing 
systems, electronic chattel paper, the stock clearing house system, the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), Automated Clearing 
House (“ACH”) transactions, bank accounts, intellectual property interests 
filed with federal registries, and consumer-purchased music through iTunes 
are all just entries in a ledger associating an identity with an interest in a 
resource.2 
This Article explores the practical and theoretical ramifications of 
recent advances in ledgers used to track and convey property interests. 
 
 1. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1363–64 (2010) (“Public land title records 
have been a fundamental feature of American law since before the founding of the 
Republic. . . . Perhaps then, it is not surprising that in the early seventeenth century, Americans began 
experimenting with laws requiring that parties create public records of conveyances and mortgages.”). 
 2. See, e.g., JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 9.03 (4th 
ed. 2013) (“In 2004, MERS extended the scope of its services by creating an ‘eRegistry’ to establish a 
central registry of interests in ‘eNotes’ or electronic promissory notes used in residential real estate 
transactions.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of 
(In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 124–25 (2007) [hereinafter Moringiello, False Categories] 
(“Articles 7 and 9 of the U.C.C. now provide for electronic documents of title and electronic chattel 
paper, respectively . . . .”); David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source 
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 224 (2004) (“[Some of] the information that prospective 
licensees and licensors need to enter into efficient transactions . . . a lready exists in public intellectual 
property registries, such as those maintained by the U.S. Patent and Copyright Offices.”). 
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Bitcoin is a rapidly developing digital currency.3 The underlying 
technology (called the “block chain”)4 has nothing in particular to do with 
money, however. Block chain technology instead represents a significant 
advance in tracking information about who owns what. It does so through a 
distributed public ledger that does not require trust in other parties or in a 
central list authority, and is robustly resistant to falsification.5 As venture 
capitalist Marc Andreessen wrote for the New York Times: 
Bitcoin gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user to transfer 
a unique piece of digital property to another Internet user, such that the 
transfer is guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone knows that the 
transfer has taken place, and nobody can challenge the legitimacy of the 
transfer. The consequences of this breakthrough are hard to overstate.6 
Most of the discussion in the legal literature and news media to date 
has centered around the use of such public ledgers as a substitute for 
currency.7 However, a distributed public ledger system confers not just the 
power to transfer dollars, but also the power to transfer anything: 
What kinds of digital property might be transferred in this way? Think 
about digital signatures, digital contracts, digital keys (to physical locks, 
 
 3. This Article is more concerned with the underlying technology of public ledgers than it is 
with the success or failure of the specific implementation of Bitcoin. Thus, questions of the volatile 
price of Bitcoin or other concerns related to the success of that specific implementation are given 
limited attention in this piece. 
 4. See infra notes 30, 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 5. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case 
Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 116 (2012). 
 6. Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters. 
 7. See generally Paul H. Farmer, Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire and the Need 
for Legal Innovation, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 85 (2014) (outlining the legal implications of categorizing 
Bitcoin as a currency); Jordon L. Ludwig, Note, Protections for Virtual Property: A Modern 
Restitutionary Approach, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing disputes over property in 
virtual worlds); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS 
SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012) (discussing whether Bitcoin can be a sustainable currency); Stephen T. 
Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues 
and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014) (discussing the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member 
LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2014) (discussing Bitcoin as a substitute for traditional financial 
systems); Kaplanov, supra note 5 (discussing the regulation of Bitcoin); Ruoke Yang, When is Bitcoin a 
Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 99, 108 (2013) (discussing whether 
Bitcoin is a security); Derek Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: 
Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165 (2013) 
(discussing the regulatory policy implications for Bitcoin); Joshua Doguet, The Nature of the Form: 
Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119 
(2013) (discussing the merits of Bitcoin as a digital currency); Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money 
Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND. L.J. 441 (2014) (discussing the money laundering 
implications for Bitcoin). 
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or to online lockers), digital ownership of physical assets such as cars 
and houses, digital stocks and bonds . . . and digital money.8 
Thus, “[f]or the first time, two people can exchange a piece of digital 
property, without any prior relationship, and in a secure way, over the 
Internet.”9 This functionality extends well beyond the use of trustless 
ledgers as online money. “The breakthrough means that, theoretically, any 
act of commerce on the Web can be decentralized and stripped of a 
controlling authority.”10 The ability to disintermediate and decentralize 
significant portions of online activity can significantly disrupt and improve 
online ownership and the legal regimes that govern it.11 
This Article addresses the potential for change in property law and the 
accompanying needed changes to property theory. Trustless ledgers offer 
the potential to significantly address one of the great inefficiencies of 
modern property: its reliance on expensive, inaccurate, hard-to-access, 
hard-to-search, and insecure ledgers of all stripes.12 Trustless technology 
can significantly reduce information costs and increase certainty across the 
law of property.13 Dusty and unsearchable courthouse land records can be 
made public and verifiable, and bank accounts can be made fully traceable, 
even down to the pennies, over years’ worth of time. 
At the outset, one caveat is important. The success or failure of 
Bitcoin in particular is ultimately of only passing interest.14 “Bitcoin is an 
experiment,” noted developer Gavin Andresen, and “maybe it will change 
the world, but realise that investing . . . in new ideas is always risky.”15 It is 
 
 8. Andreessen, supra note 6. 
 9. Rob Wile, Satoshi’s Revolution: How the Creator of Bitcoin May Have Stumbled Onto 
Something Much, Much Bigger, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2014, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-future-of-the-blockchain-2014-4 (quoting interview with Bitcoin 
developer Jeff Garzik). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Pete Rizzo, VC Fred Wilson: Block Chain Could Be Bigger Opportunity than Bitcoin, 
COINDESK (May 5, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/vc-fred-wilson-block-chain-bigger-
opportunity-bitcoin (Fred Wilson, founder of Union Square Ventures, discussing the block chain’s 
potential for disruptive innovation outside of the currency and payment spaces). 
 12. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 116 (“The bitcoin technology ensures that online transactions 
are: (1) secure; (2) efficient; and (3) free of third party presence—whether that third party is a 
government, bank, payment network, or clearinghouse.”). 
 13. See id. at 125 (“By creating a two-party payment system for online transactions, the cost of 
the transaction is reduced, thereby nearly eliminating the added costs to the consumer.”). 
 14. Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576149-even-if-it-crashes-bitcoin-may-
make-dent-financial-world-mining-digital. 
 15. See Virtual Currency Schemes, EUR. CENT. BANK 27 (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf (quoting Gavin 
Andresen, That Which Does Not Kill Us Makes Us Stronger, GAVINTHINK (June 20, 2011, 11:56 AM), 
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probable that security flaws in trustless public ledgers, their infrastructure, 
or their implementation will be discovered. Some already have been. This 
Article analyzes the potential for the technology to impact online property 
regimes, not the soundness of any one implementation. Thus, as The 
Economist noted, “[j]ust like Napster, Bitcoin may crash but leave a lasting 
legacy.”16 
Instead of offering a paean to Bitcoin, this Article makes use of the 
advent of this potentially disruptive technology17 to reflect on property 
theory,18 which has badly and barely managed the transition to the online 
ecosystem.19 Whereas contract and tort law have survived the digital 
transition more or less intact, online property interests are either intellectual 
property interests or strange amalgams of contract, licensing, and 
pseudoproperty law, such as those that govern users’ interests in e-books, 
MP3s, software, or downloaded movies.20 Traditional property law, with its 
virtues of simplicity, modularity, decentralization, disintermediation, 
 
http://gavinthink.blogspot.com/2011/06/that-which-does-not-kill-us-makes-us.html). 
 16. Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold, supra note 14. See also Michael Sivy, The Real 
Significance of the Bitcoin Boom (and Bust), TIME (Apr. 12, 2013), http://business.time.com/ 
2013/04/12/the-real-significance-of-the-bitcoin-boom-and-bust/ (“But the Bitcoin phenomenon is more 
than a bubble. It says something important about the current and future state of the global 
economy. . . . However the current boom-and-bust plays out, Bitcoin is the beginning of something, not 
the end.”); T.S., The Economist Explains: How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 11:50 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-does-
bitcoin-work (“Just as BitTorrent was not the first file-sharing service and Skype was not the first 
voice-over-internet service, it may be that Bitcoin will be a pioneer in the field of virtual currencies, but 
will be overshadowed by an easier-to-use rival.”).  
 17. Disruption in the technological context means a technological advance that unsettles legacy 
actors in an area, permitting new entrants to gain traction in the market. CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE 
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xv–xvi (1997). 
 18. See, e.g., Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the Future?, 24 
J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAC. 272, 279 (2013) (“Bitcoins are a form of intangible private property, a 
valuable digital artefact. They are not a contractual promise by or debt owed by one party to another. 
They are an asset and are the valuable property of their current owner, who can transfer them as and 
when she pleases.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 120 (“Classifying property 
according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories unrelated to significant legal 
distinctions, and these false categories hinder the ability of commercial law to expand to adequately 
accommodate electronic assets.”). 
 20. See id. (arguing that moving away from the distinction between tangible and intangible assets 
in property law “will allow commercial law to more readily adapt to the proliferation of emerging 
electronic assets that do not fit into established categories of intangible rights such as intellectual 
property and payment rights”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1052 
(2005) [hereinafter Fairfield, Virtual Property] (“[U]nreasonable contractual restraints on alienation are 
eliminated by the law of property. But currently in the context of the internet, we have imported the 
common law of contract wholesale, without the counterbalance of property law. As a result, emergent 
useful property forms are being eliminated by contract.”). 
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equalization, independence, and certainty, has not made the transition 
well.21 Until recently, it has been hard, even impossible, to own a digital 
object in the same way that one owns a car or a farm. That impossibility 
has now begun to give way to human ingenuity, and so theorists must make 
straight the way for true digital ownership interests. 
Property law is ripe for an information revolution. Information 
applications scale rapidly when costs fall.22 Property has not benefitted 
from the scaling effect of drastically reduced information costs because 
property law has been traditionally understood as being concerned with 
tangible objects, rather than information. The perhaps oversimplified 
statement of the problem is that one cannot send property over the Internet. 
Given the robust trade in digital objects, this is demonstrably not true, but 
there is a deeper issue. The very first move of property is to dissociate the 
property interest from the object. Property does not consist in the thing 
itself; rather, property consists in the packaging, tracking and transmission 
of information about the dissociation between interest and resource. The 
property interest, being information, can of course be conveyed using 
information systems. In short, property law is not primarily concerned with 
things, but with information. Structuring, streamlining, packaging, 
transmitting, storing, searching, and verifying this information is the work 
of property law. 
From this perspective, then, property is information: who owns 
what.23 Of course, property captures more interests than bare ownership, 
but the rule generalizes: property can be usefully viewed as that set of 
information describing who may do what, when, and with which resource. 
Good property rules are ones that package, convey, transmit, or verify such 
information in ways that reduce information costs, and a good property 
system is one that communicates this information and transfers the attached 
resources to new identities with minimal friction.24 One can rate good 
property systems by how well they store and communicate information 
about who owns what, and can identify poor property systems by how 
much noise and confusion their information search, storage, and transfer 
 
 21. See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2 (arguing that classifying property 
according to its tangibility poses challenges for classifying electronic assets). 
 22. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the 
Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 347–48 (2008) (“The Internet fosters innovation 
by eliminating transaction costs, enabling new services to emerge.”). 
 23. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 125–41 (discussing what may or may not 
be property under UCC Section 9). 
 24. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 22, at 348–49 (discussing how the Internet has benefitted from 
economies of scale, allowing users to capitalize on existing resources with minimal friction).  
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protocols create.25 
A theory of property as information has serious advantages over prior 
conceptions. It permits the extension of traditional property rules to digital 
and smart property, and avoids the false constraints of current theory.26 For 
instance, it simply does not matter whether the property one considers is 
tangible or intangible.27 Whether I hold a physical dollar in my hand or 
hold a dollar credited in a bank account makes no practical difference.28 
That false distinction has long bedeviled property theory and has 
particularly impeded the growth of robust markets in online property.29 A 
theory of property as information puts paid to these notions. It makes clear 
that property is an information application, best understood through the 
lens of information theory. As a result, traditional property law is entirely 
practicable in information environments. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes trustless public 
ledger technology, with a particular focus on block chain technology and 
the nascent regulatory regimes surrounding it. Part II makes the case for 
treating property as a protocol for communicating and storing information, 
and demonstrates how property can function well in information 
environments. Part III offers some concrete suggestions as to how block 
chain technology could, combined with advances in theory, lay the 
foundation for a powerful and flexible system for digital property. 
I.  TRUSTLESS TECHNOLOGY 
This part discusses technology that strongly reduces information costs 
in online property systems. The following sections provide a brief overview 
of how trustless technology creates the possibility for rapid Internet scaling 
of property applications, before describing the technical details of 
implementing a trustless system through the expedient of a public ledger. 
 
 25. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
531, 552 (2005) (“[A] property system with stable rights increases the value of assets to users (now 
owners) and decreases the costs of obtaining and defending those assets.”). 
 26. See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2. 
 27. See id. at 137, 141 (“Despite the fact that individuals commonly think of intangible rights 
embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property, intangible rights unconnected to tangible 
things continue to confound judges. . . . The intangible nature of assets . . . seems to blind courts to 
general property principles.”). 
 28. Juliet Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159, 176 
(2010) [hereinafter Moringiello, Virtual Worlds] (“In a sense, all money is virtual.”); Moringiello, False 
Categories, supra note 2, at 136 (“Most of us would consider our bank accounts to be our property 
notwithstanding the intangibility of the bank account.”). 
 29. See id. at 141–43 (discussing how the intangibility of online assets has caused confusion in 
the courts). 
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The discussion continues with a description of the different possible use 
cases for trustless architectures and the regulatory regimes that have to date 
been brought to bear. Bitcoin as a specific implementation, and the 
technological characteristics of that specific implementation, are only 
discussed here insofar as they help the reader understand the core points 
about digital property and trustless public ledgers.30  
A.  TRUSTLESS PUBLIC LEDGERS 
The primary information cost in online property systems is trust. Users 
must trust that any registry or ledger of property rights is accurate and 
secure. These verification costs are generally paid by users to a centralized 
authority that maintains the register of rights. Trustless ledgers, by contrast, 
are a communications protocol that reduces information costs by 
eliminating the need for trust in a central curator. Such ledgers enable peer-
to-peer digital property transactions without intermediaries.31 This is the 
concept of trustlessness. 
As an example, one might consider the balance in a bank account. The 
account itself is a mere entry in a private ledger maintained by the bank. 
Trust in the bank account depends on trust in the bank.32 If trust in the bank 
fails, the bank account is no longer a store of value, but a useless entry on 
the bank’s ledger. Parties can trust such centralized ledgers only as far as 
they can trust the centralized authority.33 In the case of bank deposit 
accounts, such trust might be justified. In the case of 1980s-era Savings and 
 
 30. A few definitions apply throughout. The term “trustless” is used here to encompass a band of 
extremely low-trust applications based on a distributed public ledger that is secured by an effective 
proof system to ensure the integrity of the ledger despite its decentralization. Note that “trustless” does 
not imply a lack of trust in the system. To the contrary: it implies that the system is sufficiently 
trustworthy that no one actor within the system needs to be trusted for the system to work. “Block 
chain” refers to a kind of public ledger that relies on a distributed proof system to prevent falsification 
or double spending. The term “block chain” can refer either to the Bitcoin block chain, or to the block 
chain underlying an alternative chain application. When referred to in the singular, “the block chain” 
refers to the Bitcoin block chain. “Bitcoin” itself refers to the currency implementation—just one 
example of trustless public ledger architecture, although it is by far the best-known example. This 
terminological distinction between Bitcoin and the underlying block chain is important, because it is 
precisely that distinction that permits innovators to envision building non-currency applications using 
trustless public ledger architecture. 
 31. See, e.g., Barrett Sheridan, Bitcoins: Currency of the Geeks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 16, 
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_26/b4234041554873.htm (explaining how 
Bitcoin transactions do not require a “middleman”). 
 32. See Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, supra note 28 at 176 (“Money is based on trust; currency 
has value because people trust that it can be exchanged for items of value and other currencies.”). 
 33. Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 9–10 (“People are willing to accept [currency] 
in exchange for goods and services simply because they trust this central authority. Trust is therefore a 
crucial element of any fiat money system.”). 
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Loans, it would not. Trust in the ledger entry of a bank account is only as 
good as the trust in the institution that maintains it.34 
Enormous resources currently go into generating trust, which makes 
trust-based systems expensive.35 To maintain trust, the centralized authority 
must restrict access to the ledger, while itself submitting to expensive (but 
necessary) oversight to ensure its own trustworthiness. If just anyone could 
change the ledger, under the traditional system, trust would evaporate. 
Even if one were inclined to trust the centralized administrator, one could 
not possibly trust everyone who could make changes to the centralized 
ledger. Consider, for example, a case in which all customers were free to 
edit their bank account balances at will. This would reduce the transaction 
and processing costs of maintaining the ledger system (since the bank 
would not have to pay for systems and people to do so) but would also 
destroy trust in the system. 
Trustless public ledgers are a proposed solution to the problem of 
expensive trust. Bitcoin is the best known implementation, and thus serves 
as a good example here. The Bitcoin protocol creates a ledger out of a 
series of groups of transactions, termed simply “blocks,” which as a whole 
form a log of all transfers, termed the “block chain.”36 The block chain is 
not maintained by any single entity, but instead relies on a mathematically 
innovative consensus model.37 Bitcoin creates a manipulation-resistant 
solution to the problem of trust—a way of providing verification without 
centralization and its attendant risks and costs. This mechanism is 
discussed at more length in Section I.B, below. 
Trustless public ledger systems are of course neither entirely devoid of 
trust38 nor completely zero cost.39 The systems propose only to 
significantly reduce the need for trust and its associated costs. Reduction of 
the need for trust eliminates a constant source of friction in online 
transactions. Internet technologies scale most disruptively at near-zero 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. See generally Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
457, 474–76 (2001). 
 36. See supra note 30 (defining “block chain”). 
 37. See Sheridan, supra note 31 (discussing the mechanics of Bitcoin). 
 38. For example, even if one does not trust a central authority, one might trust the 
implementation of the protocol, the actors who implement the protocol, or the essential mathematical 
soundness of the protocol itself in the face of sustained and highly motivated attack.  
 39. For example, bitcoin miners are incentivized to perform the verification function through 
grants of new bitcoins. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. This creates a functional tax through 
inflation.  
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transaction costs.40 Transaction costs need not be zero, merely low enough 
to open a range of new uses. The Internet, for all of its “free” price points, 
is extraordinarily expensive to maintain. Yet near-zero costs have produced 
a range of highly scaled and novel applications. For each drop in 
transaction costs, a new range of widely scaled and potentially disruptive 
uses becomes practicable.41 Eliminating the cost of trust creates the 
possibility of true Internet-like scalability for property and currency 
transactions.42 
Trustless ledgers can and will reshape property law if they push price 
points low enough to unleash disruptive and scalable applications. Property 
registries as they currently stand are a hodgepodge of relatively inaccurate, 
sometimes insecure, and often expensive ledgers.43 Property records are 
notoriously costly to search.44 Companies that maintain ledgers (and cannot 
perfectly price discriminate) have incentives to bar access to some potential 
users in order to keep prices high. Access fees to ledger databases are often 
well above what ordinary people can pay, and thus the systems do not 
scale. As two scholars, describing unsuccessful attempts to reform the land 
transfer system in 1939, lamented: 
Yet for the achievement of such reforms without payment of undue and 
continued tribute to private monopolies and without fruitless bother and 
delay—perhaps even if they are to be achieved at all—major changes 
must be effected in our antiquated, pre-commerce “system” of land 
transfer. Cheap, expeditious, and secure methods must be designed, if 
they are not already available, to replace the present complicated and 
dilatory methods which, while costly to the individual and burdensome 
to the public, afford no adequate security of title. Streamlined need 
cannot long endure horse-and-buggy obstacles to the liquidity of land. It 
is an ancient query, but its relevance grows: why should not a lot or a 
farm be as easily acquired and as securely held as a ship or a share of 
stock or an automobile?45 
 
 40. Werbach, supra note 22, at 347–48. 
 41. See id. at 349 (“Common networks facilitate innovation independent of the infrastructure 
platform, which can create significantly more value than the network itself.”). 
 42. See Frankel, supra note 35, at 460 (“[I]f the risks and costs of reducing the risks to the 
trusting party are higher than the benefits, it will not interact. If the costs to the trusted party of 
establishing its trustworthiness are higher than the benefits, it will not interact.”). 
 43. Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 YALE 
L.J. 1125, 1126–29 (1939) (“Why cannot a lot or a farm be so easily acquired and securely held? The 
answer can be found in any courthouse. It is in the wild disorder and the incompleteness of the public 
records.”). 
 44. Peterson, supra note 1, at 1405. 
 45. McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra note 43, at 1126 (footnotes omitted). 
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The problems of centralization, oligopoly, expense, and inaccuracy 
remain every bit as driving now as in 1939, and the central question 
remains unchanged: why should not numerous different forms of property 
be as easily acquired and as securely held as the simple switch of bits on a 
digital ledger?46 
More is at stake than saving dollars on a few property transactions. 
Fixing property costs will change the Internet, not merely property law. A 
major use of the Internet is the transfer of property interests. Alibaba, eBay, 
and Amazon are prime examples.47 The cost of property interest transfers 
operates as a component of, and thus a lower bound to, the efficiency of 
Internet technologies. Assuming consumers have different preferences and 
abilities to pay, there remains a range of transactions for which the 
minimum transaction cost outweighs the welfare surplus for the consumer 
or provider. These transactions do not occur because of cost, and the 
welfare gain is not realized. The costs of searching, moving, and 
maintaining interests in property act as a drag not only on individual actors 
seeking to transact at lower costs, but on the entire online ecosystem. By 
reducing the transaction costs associated with transferring property 
interests, it is possible to remove a serious limit on the ability of electronic 
applications to deliver welfare gains.48 Minimum transaction costs enable 
microtransactions,49 and microtransactions enable a range of wealth-
generating behavior that is below the prior lower bounds of the property 
and currency systems. The lower the bound, the more new trades become 
possible; the smaller the transaction cost, the less wealth is simply left on 
the cutting room floor. 
B.  BITS AND BOLTS 
This section provides a very brief overview of the mechanics of block 
chain technology, with a specific focus on new developments that make 
trustless public ledgers, such as the block chain, an interesting technology 
for property systems. The first subpart will deal with how trustless public 
 
 46. For the property initiate: this Article advances no position on the Torrens system itself, nor 
does that debate bear on this piece except to the extent of the motivating concerns of cost, convenience, 
and, in the context of Internet technologies, scalability. 
 47. See generally What is eBay, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.in/help/account/questions/about-
ebay.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015); About Amazon, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Careers-
Homepage/b?node=239364011 (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
 48. See Werbach, supra note 22, at 347–48 (“The internet fosters innovation by eliminating 
transaction costs, enabling new services to emerge.”). 
 49. Testimony of Jeremy Liew Before the New York State Department of Financial Services, N.Y. 
STATE DEP’T FIN. SERVICES 1 (Jan. 28, 2014), http://dfs.ny.gov/about/hearings/vc_01282014/liew.pdf. 
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ledgers work, the second will explain how tokenized versions of existing 
public ledgers might be adapted to serve as public ledgers for property 
systems, and the third will deal with new developments in the technology 
that are particularly well-suited to property applications. 
1.  How Trustless Public Ledgers Work 
a.  The Double-Spending Problem 
To create a coherent and useful online property system, one must 
solve the challenges of duplication and double spending.50 Duplication is 
the first and most immediate problem.51 If users can duplicate digital 
property, an MP3 for example, the marginal sale price commanded by the 
good goes rapidly to zero. Similarly, if a currency can be duplicated, the 
value of the currency evaporates under hyperinflation. 
Double spending is a specific version of the duplication problem that 
emerges in systems that enact partially effective duplication controls.52 
Double spending occurs when the record owner of an asset conveys it 
forward to two (or more) different entities.53 It is an exploit of the 
conveyance mechanism in property systems. Such systems must permit 
conveyance, but if conveyance can be from A to B, or from A to C, then A 
may seek to benefit from a conveyance to B and then to C, with neither B 
nor C knowing about the other. 
Double spending becomes an issue whenever outright duplication has 
been made cost-prohibitive by some measure (say, license servers for 
MP3s, anti-forgery measures for land deeds, or anti-counterfeiting 
measures for currencies), and it becomes cheaper to exploit the conveyance 
 
 50. David Frisch, Buyer Status Under the U.C.C.: A Suggested Temporal Definition, 72 IOWA L. 
REV. 531, 531 (1987) (“The recognition of private property requires a comprehensive and systematic 
body of detailed rules to permit and control the transfer of property. Although these rules must 
necessarily comprehend innumerable transfer scenarios and force choices implicating difficult value 
judgments, at the most basic level two problems must be confronted: (1) how to accomplish a transfer 
of an item of property or an interest therein; and (2) how to resolve competing claims to the same item 
or interest.”). 
 51. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, 
Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 454 (1996) (“Because the digital cash is 
represented by a series of bits, and there are few things in this life easier to copy than bits, the bank is 
going to be very anxious to ensure that any copies of the digital cash . . . will be unspendable, or at least 
very easy to detect.”). 
 52. See J.P. & G.T., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency (“This provides a degree of 
security against theft. But it does not prevent an owner of Bitcoins from spending his Bitcoins 
twice . . . .”). 
 53. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 117 n.35. 
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mechanism than to counterfeit the asset directly. For example, when 
counterfeiting dollars becomes hard and expensive, the petty crime of 
choice becomes writing bad checks. Check fraud exploits a delay in the 
currency conveyance system and enables the double spending of currency. 
Double spending is a primary concern for both traditional property 
systems54 and for cryptocurrencies.55 It is easy to see why cryptocurrencies 
need to solve the double-spending problem. If one can spend the same 
currency multiple times, recipients cannot trust payments.56 The creators of 
public ledgers expressly noted that their design was an attempt to solve the 
double-spending problem without resorting to centralized authorities.57 
In this sense, the problems of public ledgers are the problems of 
property law generally. Prevention of double spending is just as much a 
central concern of traditional land conveyancing or personal property 
transfers as it is of digital property or cryptocurrencies.58 Consider bona 
fide purchasers of land, for example.59 A seller of land may convey land by 
multiple deeds to multiple downstream purchasers: basic double spending. 
The response of the law is a recording system, a ledger in which sales are 
recorded, to limit the potential for double sales. 
Yet recording acts do not eliminate the problem because buyers do not 
have to record deeds in order for the transfer to be effective. Sellers can 
still exploit the conveyance mechanism.60 So the law of conveyancing 
relies on incentives to encourage parties to get their interests on record by 
affording protection if the entry is recorded in the centralized ledger.61 
Depending on the state recording act, a subsequent bona fide purchaser of 
real estate, or a bona fide purchaser who files first, will take as against an 
 
 54. See id. at 117–18 (“In traditional payment systems, this problem is overcome by relying on a 
central authority to check each transaction or by issuing a serial number to prevent double spending.”). 
 55. See id. at 116 (“[I]t may be difficult to prevent the same user from double spending the same 
digital coins by copying them.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 116–17. 
 58. See infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., Soulé v. Gragg (In re Harrison), 503 B.R. 835, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2013) (“The 
rule is well established in [Oklahoma] that in the transfer of real estate in the absence of actual or 
constructive notice of a previous conveyance or of matters which would put a purchaser on inquiry, a 
bona fide purchaser for value will take good title to the property.”). 
 60. See, e.g., John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can 
Reasonable Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 455 (1996) (“Since recording first is not necessary 
to prevail against the ‘earlier’ unrecorded interest in a notice jurisdiction, the incentive to the 
subsequent bona fide purchaser to record promptly is to protect the title she or he acquired from 
‘another’ subsequent purchaser.”). 
 61. Id. at 454–56 (discussing past recording laws). 
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unfiled interest in the land.62 This is a complicated and bad system for 
curtailing double spending. The risk falls on the purchasers (who often both 
have good faith) and does not directly reduce incentives to double spend in 
the first place. The risk can continue to spread if buyers further convey 
forward. A defect in title history can threaten downstream interests years 
and sometimes decades later. 
In short, all property conveyance systems share problems of 
duplication and double spending. Until recently, there was only one 
broadly workable solution. A central, trusted authority or network of 
authorities was required to maintain the ledger and track, verify, and 
register all transactions.63 For example, the Copyright Office verifies the 
integrity of the register of copyrights; the Patent and Trademark Office 
does the same for patents and trademarks; state Secretaries of State (for the 
most part) play this role under the UCC personal property filing system; 
and private entities like MERS and Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation fill similar roles for mortgages and stocks.64 
Unsurprisingly, the first digital currencies followed a similar 
centralized model. A centralized issuing authority would maintain a trusted 
ledger on which transactions could be logged. DigiCash, eGold, and Venn 
are (or were) examples of digital currencies issued by central authorities.65 
Even those online digital currencies that were backed by some real 
commodity, such as gold or carbon credits, still relied on a central authority 
to maintain the register. Such registers were generally not public, and so 
trust in the issuer was an absolute necessity for the currency to gain 
widespread use. If trust in the issuer failed, for example, because the issuer 
inflated the currency by simply issuing more of it, or because of a failure to 
protect the ledger from hacks, the currency failed as well. 
b.  The Public Ledger Solution 
A solution to the centralized authority problem was to make the ledger 
public. Imagine an online list intended to track ownership of property 
interests A, B, and C. At the start, perhaps Mary owns A, Joshua owns B, 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (“In a centralised system, [theft is prevented] by clearing 
transactions through a single database.”). 
 64. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 116 (describing the use of a distributed public ledger); About 
Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://wwwuspto.gov/about-us (last visited Mar. 27, 2015); 
Overview of the Copyright Office, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/ about (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2015). 
 65. See Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 819–20 (describing a number of non-Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency and virtual currency implementations). 
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and Maggie owns C. We record this original set of interests in the list. Each 
time an interest changes hands, the ledger is updated, and the new list is 
distributed to everyone. In this way, the ownership interest can cheaply 
change hands with no need for a central authority. 
Yet even with this extremely simplified system, there are several 
problems. Suppose Mary wishes to convey her interest to Grace. How can 
she do so, given that the two may not know each other, or may only be able 
to communicate electronically? The answer lies in cryptography.66 Each 
person within the property system has a pair of cryptographically related 
keys, one public, given to everyone in the world to use, and one private, 
held only by the individual.67 The keys are mathematically related, yet it is 
not possible to use the public key to guess the private key.68 With the 
public key, one can send messages, bitcoins, or anything else, in a way that 
only the person with the private key can access. A commonly used analogy 
is that of a letterbox. The public key is the address of the letterbox. Anyone 
can put a letter in. But only the owner of the letterbox has the key to open it 
and retrieve the contents.69 
Cryptography therefore secures the transfer of ownership interests in 
our simple online list. If Mary wishes to send her property interest to 
Grace, she encrypts it using Grace’s public key and sends it. Only Grace 
can receive and decrypt it. Mary has confidence that she has sent the 
property to Grace, and Grace has confidence that no one else can access or 
use what was sent to her. The use of cryptography prevents anyone from 
standing in the middle of the transaction, since they cannot decrypt and 
therefore access the transmitted property interest. It does not prevent 
duplication or double spending, however. While Mary’s ability to send the 
interest and receive payment is adequately protected by cryptography, there 
is the further problem that Mary may try to double sell her interest to both 
Grace and Hannah. 
A log of transactions prevents double sales. If the log is up to date, a 
subsequent transfer from Mary to Hannah would be rejected because the 
record would show that Mary’s interest had already been transferred to 
Grace. Trustless technology addresses the double-spending problem 
through the block chain, the decentralized and public log of all transactions. 
 
 66. See CHRISTOF PAAR & JAN PELZL, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR 
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 149–74 (2010) (discussing public-key cryptography). 
 67. J.P. & G.T., supra note 52. See also Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 23 
(describing public and private key pairing in a Bitcoin transaction). 
 68. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 117. 
 69. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 31–32 (1996). 
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For example, under the Bitcoin block chain protocol, transactions during a 
ten-minute period of time70 are gathered by third parties (termed “miners” 
for reasons explored below) into a discrete “block” of transactions.71 Once 
the transactions in a given block of time are verifiably baked into the 
overall list of transactions, they become the latest block of transactions in a 
chain of such blocks, hence the term block chain. The block chain 
constitutes a complete transaction history of all transfers of the asset (and, 
indeed, all other assets recorded in the chain), going back to the creation or 
original allocation of the asset.72 All transactions must be registered with 
the chain and included in a block to transfer the interest.73 Anyone can 
download the public ledger and thus see which keys hold which assets. 
The significant innovation of the block chain lies in how blocks are 
added to the transactional chain without relying on a central authority, a 
process termed “mining.” Miners are computers that provide computing 
resources to the network, and in turn, are rewarded through processing fees 
or through a grant of new bitcoins entering the system.74 Miners do not 
discover new units—to that extent, the analogy to gold miners is 
misleading. Rather, miners do a lot of work to secure the system and are 
paid a small amount in a distributed fashion for their contributions.75 
Mining consists of guessing numbers.76 Imagine rolling a twenty-
sided die. Each time someone rolls under a five, they get a reward. The 
more people roll, the faster results under five are generated; if that’s 
happening too quickly, the system can adjust so that only rolls under a 
 
 70. J.P. & G.T., supra note 52. The time per block is arbitrarily set by the creators of the 
protocol, and the algorithm adjusts so that new blocks are opened at the same rate regardless of the 
computing resources available to the network. New protocols, such as Litecoin, benefit from faster 
block times, meaning that transactions clear more quickly. Ian Steadman, Wary of Bitcoin? A Guide to 
Some Other Cryptocurrencies, ARS TECHNICA (May 11, 2013, 6:51 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/05/wary-of-bitcoin-a-guide-to-some-other-cryptocurrencies. 
 71. Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
 72. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118. 
 73. Id. 
 74. This is payment of processing fees by inflation. As new bitcoins enter the system, all prior 
bitcoins decrease very mildly in value, to the benefit of the entity which receives the new coins. The 
Bitcoin network in particular addresses this concern by creating a hard cap of 21 million bitcoins that 
can ever exist and decreasing the rate of return in new bitcoins per block, so that eventually miners will 
be paid entirely from small processing fees rather than by inflation of the overall system. But this is 
essentially an advertising point for the system, which is meant to attract anti-inflationary monetary 
theorists. The system could just as easily be designed with a constant and limited inflationary rate to 
continue paying for mining through inflation. Id. at 119–21. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Thanks to Google engineer Mike Shick for providing this analogy in conversations at the 
Digital Asset Transfer Authority Gala, and for his continuing kindness in describing the underlying 
technology. 
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three or under a two are rewarded. This kind of dice rolling appears to be, 
and in fact is, a waste of resources. The dice rolling discovers nothing 
worth discovering. But the dice rolling has one advantage. If the only way 
to get a result is to roll, and if there is no way to simulate or falsify rolling, 
then people have to roll the dice to play the game. 
This is how the block chain works.77 Mining computers attempt to 
guess a hash value.78 “A hash is a way of transforming an arbitrary amount 
of data to a fixed size number.”79  
[Thus,] a hash is not invertible (you can’t recover the data from the hash) 
and a small change in the input data creates a large change in the hash 
value. Miners search for hashes with particular characteristics (for 
example, the number of leading zeroes) in the only way possible: by 
taking the block and adding a random number to it, and then computing 
the hash of the block plus the random number, and checking it for the 
desired characteristics.80 
The hash is unpredictable.81 No one can tell ahead of time what the 
result of each try will be. The only way to do it is to guess repeatedly and 
rapidly. The protocol then sets a number of zeroes that must appear at the 
beginning of the resulting hash as a way of adjusting the problem difficulty. 
As more computers join the network, the math problem that must be solved 
to open a new block simply becomes more difficult. Of course, the analogy 
has limits. The so-called dice rolled in the Bitcoin protocol have more sides 
than there are atoms in the universe.82 But for purposes of this discussion, 
the idea is that miners must roll dice until they get an arbitrarily difficult 
result. 
Each time a miner finds a hash that meets the threshold, that miner is 
permitted to add a block to the chain. The miner has proven that it has done 
the work necessary to find a solution. Hence, the process of securing a 
block chain is called a “proof-of-work” system.83 Each block’s numerical 
value (unrelated to its financial value) is linked to the value of the prior 
block. In order to falsify the block chain, an attacker must do two difficult 
 
 77. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118–19. 
 78. Id. at 118 n.49. 
 79. Thanks to Google engineer Nathaniel Fairfield for this analogy, suggested in comments to 
the piece and used with permission. 
 80. Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 118 n.49. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Alex Gorale, Explaining the Math Behind Bitcoin, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (Oct. 18, 2014, 11:44 
AM), http://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/explaining-the-math-behind-bitcoin/.  
 83. Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money 
Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529, 532 (2014). 
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things. If the attacker wishes to change a past transaction, the attacker 
must—alone!—win enough die rolls so that she outpaces the rest of the 
system. That is, faking the past is prohibitively difficult because any 
attacker would have to match the combined processing power of the entire 
network over that period of time. And to continue the falsification moving 
forward into the future, the attacker would have to make guesses faster than 
the current block chain. The protocol accepts as true the block chain with 
the greater computational difficulty.84 So an attacker would have to guess 
more hashes faster or at a higher computational difficulty than the rest of 
the currently functioning network.85 
The result is a distributed public ledger of interests that is difficult to 
falsify and that becomes harder to falsify as more computers are added to 
the network. It would take hundreds of times the processing power of all of 
the world’s top fifty supercomputers to accomplish that task. Keeping up 
the deception would be like lifting an ever-increasing stack of cars just to 
steal a hubcap. This new mix of security and decentralization is the reason 
that public ledger technology has received so much attention from 
entrepreneurs and innovators. 
c.  Network Effects and Vulnerabilities 
The system is not without its vulnerabilities.86 The ability of a trustless 
ledger to provide frictionless transactions is directly tied to its ability to 
scale. As Marc Andreessen noted: 
Bitcoin is a classic network effect, a positive feedback loop. The more 
people who use Bitcoin, the more valuable Bitcoin is for everyone who 
uses it, and the higher the incentive for the next user to start using the 
technology. Bitcoin shares this network effect property with the 
telephone system, the web, and popular Internet services like eBay and 
Facebook.87 
 
 84. Although this is often expressed as the network preferring the longer block chain, that is not 
always the case. Imagine a block chain made up of easier computational guesses—that chain could be 
longer in terms of blocks than a shorter chain comprised of much more difficult computational guesses. 
 85. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 120 n.57 (stating that an “attacker would require fifty percent 
of the processing power to disrupt the bitcoin network, an unlikely event”). More recent theories 
indicate that a 33 percent stake would be enough to disrupt the currency. Samuel Gibbs, Bitcoin Could 
Be Hijacked by “Selfish” Groups Causing Currency Collapse,  GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:26 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/bitcoin-hijack-research-mining. 
 86. The means by which a trustless ledger might be compromised is beyond the scope of this 
piece. Broadly, centralization is the primary threat. If too much of a network is concentrated in the 
hands of any one group, then that group can subvert the network by brute force. It is also of course 
possible to compromise the security of the exchanges, but this is a matter of general cybersecurity.  
 87. Andreessen, supra note 6. 
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The network effect can propel a new technology to prominence and 
widespread adoption, but it can also impede innovation. Inferior 
technologies can defeat superior technologies by virtue of large and 
established networks. Thus, for example, the market in desktop operating 
systems is commonly held to have stagnated because of the large legacy 
network of installed operating systems. Only with the advent of tablet and 
smartphone operating systems was the installed base different enough to 
permit a new and competitive network to grow. 
The problem with network effects and innovation often stems from the 
proprietary nature of the network. This is what prompts cries for antitrust 
enforcement against companies that occupy a dominant network position in 
an online market.88 When monopolists lock out competitors, the threat to 
innovation is clear. However, the threat does not entirely, or even 
predominantly, arise out of anticompetitive urges. Even in a decentralized 
network, the value of the network grows non-linearly as a function of the 
number of nodes in the network.89 Simply put, an innovator may need to 
build on top of an existing network, rather than start her own network, even 
if there is no anticompetitive entity seeking to lock her out. 
As a result of this network effect, innovators will have great difficulty 
establishing their own completely separate networks. 
For this reason alone, new challengers to Bitcoin face a hard uphill 
battle. If something is to displace Bitcoin now, it will have to have 
sizable improvements and it will have to happen quickly. Otherwise, this 
network effect will carry Bitcoin to dominance.90 
Just as the existence of strong network effects provides a challenge to 
innovators, innovators undermine already existing networks if they are 
forced to build separate networks rather than building on what is already 
available. For example, the attempt to establish separate block chains 
undermines the security of the main Bitcoin block chain. The more 
computers contribute processor cycles to the block chain by mining, the 
more secure it is. If mining resources are divided between two networks, 
both networks are weaker. Further, because security grows non-linearly as 
a function of the number of nodes, both networks are significantly weaker 
 
 88. See generally STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS AND 
MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (analyzing the Microsoft 
antitrust case in the context of the high-speed software industry). 
 89. For example, Metcalfe’s Law posits that the value of a communications network grows as the 
square of the number of nodes. See James Hendler & Jennifer Golbeck, Metcalfe’s Law, Web 2.0, and 
the Semantic Web, 6 J. WEB SEMANTICS 14, 14 (2007). 
 90. Andreessen, supra note 6. 
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than one network with double the resources would be. Baby block chains 
are both a threat to the main block chain—since they take power that would 
otherwise be available to that system and divert it—and are themselves 
vulnerable, since they do not have the processing power to defend 
themselves. 
This is the current state of affairs. The current main Bitcoin block 
chain resists falsification because it is the biggest network.91 A large 
amount of processing power would need to be devoted to the block chain 
over a significant period of time in order to falsify the public ledger. New 
technologies and uses will be more secure if innovators can build them on 
top of the Bitcoin block chain rather than starting afresh and attempting to 
gather another network of computers. In a way, first adopters are the scarce 
resource. Getting enough miners to join a new network detracts from the 
prior network. If a full range of different and innovative applications could 
be built on top of the same block chain, then each technology could benefit 
from the strength and security of the combined mining for that chain. 
Technologies built on top of the current Bitcoin block chain would take 
shelter in the security of the current network, while being available for the 
development of new uses. 
2.  Tokenized Property 
Innovators who wish to implement property systems in a trustless 
ledger might create their own network, separate from all others, and try to 
make that network large and fast.92 They are likely to better succeed, 
however, if they build property systems on top of existing networks. One 
way to do so is by treating the slots in a public ledger not as coins, but as 
tokens that represent a property interest. 
Consider, for example, a group that wished to tokenize rights in 
favors. So if A owes B a favor, B may wish to convey that favor to C, and 
C to D, and so on. If the group wanted to expand the favor network to the 
entire country, it could purchase a single bitcoin. Since bitcoins are 
divisible to eight decimal places, the group then could divide that single 
 
 91. However, falsification is feasible, especially during technological paradigm shifts. For 
example, the shift to application-specific integrated circuit mining led to a concentration of mining 
power within the Bitcoin ecosystem, such that one mining group was, for a twelve hour span, able to 
surpass the 51 percent mark. Joel Hruska, One Bitcoin group now controls 51% of total mining power, 
threatening entire currency’s safety, EXTREMETECH (June 16, 2014, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/184427-one-bitcoin-group-now-controls-51-of-total-mining-
power-threatening-entire-currencys-safety.  
 92. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (discussing how security in block chain technologies 
consumes processing cycles and requires widespread adoption). 
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coin up and issue one hundred million tokens—each one a single “satoshi,” 
the smallest unit of bitcoin that can be tracked and traded.93 A satoshi 
originating from the “favor” bitcoin would represent the favor. For a cost 
ranging between $500 and $1000, the group could secure one hundred 
million tokens that are tracked and protected by the full computing power 
of the block chain. 
There are efforts underway to build such systems on top of the Bitcoin 
block chain.94 For example, a company might decide to convey ownership 
of a commodity like gold by tying it to specific coins within the chain.95 
The company may then arbitrarily designate coins that it owns as 
“colored,” that is, as having some significance beyond the coin itself.96 
This designation in no way impacts the rest of the block chain, which is in 
fact oblivious to the additional meaning attached to the coins by the 
company. Any coin traceable back to an original gold-colored coin takes on 
the characteristics of the original coin. Whoever controls the coin, controls 
the commodity. Multiple colors are of course possible, with each different 
application resting on a different set of colored coins. 
The more closely the conveyed interest is tied to the token, the more 
effective token systems become. For example, assume that the interest 
parties wished to convey was the ownership of the token itself. The public 
ledger would accomplish that without any complexity. The person who has 
the token in their digital wallet—that is, the person to whom the ledger 
ascribes ownership—would hold the right. 
There is only slight additional complexity for tracking intangible 
rights distinct from, but connected to, the token. Consider a fantasy 
baseball league in which participants trade “players” by ascribing to one 
person within the league the right to use a particular real-world player’s 
stats in determining the success of a virtual baseball team. Only one 
participant within the league may count a player on their virtual team, per 
the rules of the game. The resource is separate from the token. The token is 
not the resource itself, but the token conveys the right in a public fashion, 
so that participants in the system may know who may exercise the right. 
Tying a token to a legal right is common in property law. For 
 
 93. Andreessen, supra note 6; Jim Kessler, John Vahey & Matthew Caulfield, Bitcoin: Back to 
the Future, THIRD WAY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://thirdway.org/report/bitcoin-back-to-the-future. 
 94. See, e.g., Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin Reveals Ethereum at Bitcoin Miami 2014, YOUTUBE 
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9dpjN3Mwps (discussing various uses for the 
Bitcoin block chain). 
 95. Id. at 4:35. 
 96. Id. at 5:05, 8:20. 
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example, while land itself cannot be conveyed in a ledger, it is legally 
uncontroversial to tie the right to land to a token—a deed97—that can be 
cheaply and quickly transferred, and that can be recorded in a ledger of 
interests. If there is a dispute as to the ownership of a plot of land, courts 
refer to the land records ledger, at least as a starting point.98 To give 
another example, a stock certificate has no intrinsic value. The certificate 
serves as a token that conveys certain rights; for example, the right to vote 
or the right to receive dividends. From handing over the car keys as 
symbolic delivery of a gift of personal property,99 to conveying ownership 
in bulk commodities through warehouse receipts,100 to the ritual of livery of 
seisin at common law, the law has long recognized the need to transfer 
property interests through the expedient of a symbol, deed, or token.101 
Token systems work well to transfer rival legal rights to exercise the 
prerogatives of ownership over a given resource, whether in the form of a 
stock certificate, oil or gas lease, land deed, copyright or patent registration, 
or any other right dependent on a ledger entry. The question is not whether 
those rights can be tokenized. They already are. The relevant question is 
whether a trustless, public, and cryptographically secure ledger can provide 
better tokens. Currently extant property transfer systems were originally 
adopted because they offered better security, more certainty, and lower 
costs than prior methods of property conveyance. In the same way, new 
systems that improve security, certainty, and speed at reduced cost have the 
potential to improve on legacy property systems. 
Tokenized public ledgers offer new solutions to old property 
problems. The tokens can be securely transferred for very little cost. A 
 
 97. Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20 (2006).  
 98. Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W. 3d 615, 621 (Tex. 2012) (“Record title . . . typically refers to 
legal evidence of a person’s ownership right in property.”). Compare United States v. Ellis, 739 F.2d 
1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Illinois law defines the owner of an automobile as the person holding 
title . . . .”), and Tusa v. Omaha Auto Auction, Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
Nebraska Supreme Court held that there would not be an exception to the general rule that the title is 
conclusive evidence of ownership where the titleholders voluntarily put their names on the title . . . .”), 
with In re James, 496 B.R. 590, 595 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2013) (“[I]n Arkansas, certificate of title is only 
evidence of title to a vehicle, not title itself.”). 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2, cmt. g 
(2003) (discussing symbolic delivery). Possession is used as the crudest proxy of all, but faute de mieux 
has remained in widespread use. Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 100. Donald B. Pedersen, Electronic Data Interchange as Documents of Title for Fungible 
Agricultural Commodities, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 719, 732–36 (1995). 
 101. See Frisch, supra note 50, at 531 (“To deal with the [problem of competing interests in 
property], one finds a history rich in rules clothed in ceremonial garb. The play is everything: a transfer 
occurs only if properly performed.”). 
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block chain can trace transactions even where the number and speed of 
such transactions would confound a regular recording system.102 Attempts 
to double spend tokens are rapidly detected and resolved. Unlike many 
property systems, where clouds on title resulting from double spending can 
last for years, double sales within a public ledger are blocked within 
minutes. Indeed, while the passage of time makes interests in traditional 
property more obscure and less secure, the passage of even an hour builds a 
transaction so firmly into the block chain that it cannot practically be 
reversed or falsified. 
3.  Protocol Networks and Side-Chains 
Enthusiasts and entrepreneurs have proposed a range of improvements 
to public ledger technologies.103 Some of the best ideas address how the 
protocol can support uses beyond simple currency simulation. Thus, for 
example, one innovative proposal is to use the block chain as a 
communications protocol on top of which anything can be built, rather than 
merely a currency with some alternative uses through tokenization. This 
approach uses a Turing-complete programming language to permit users to 
create any program, riding on top of a decentralized block chain, rather 
than riding on top of a traditional database.104 The functional entity within 
the proposed new system is a “contract”—a software agent that resides 
within the block chain and commands resources from that chain.105 For 
example, parties might set up a very simple hedging contract, in which both 
parties put one thousand dollars’ worth of trustless currency in, and the 
hedging party would, at the end of the contract, receive one thousand 
dollars’ worth of currency back, hedging the risk against downward market 
volatility but granting upside gains to the other party.106 
Networks built to service a range of applications offer significant 
advantages over networks built for a single use case. For example, treating 
the block chain as a communications protocol would open trustless public 
ledgers to more advanced property applications. It may well be that the 
existing main block chain needs to be reworked in order to serve as an 
effective underlying protocol for the broader range of applications that 
startups are now considering. Yet there is a cost each time for doing so, and 
 
 102. See Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 21 n.4 (“[A]ll Bitcoin transactions are 
recorded and can . . . be traced.”). 
 103. See generally Ethereum, supra note 94 (discussing various implementations for the Bitcoin 
block chain). 
 104. Id. at 9:15. 
 105. Id. at 6:28. 
 106. Id. at 6:46. 
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it is entirely possible that at some point, the network benefits of an existing 
public ledger will be sufficiently high that starting over is not an option. In 
short, there must be another way to innovate in public ledger technology 
besides starting the network over each time. 
Another innovation, called a “side-chain,” may make it possible to 
leverage the strongest existing public ledger for new and innovative 
applications, without requiring those technologies to start over and build 
entirely new networks.107 In a side-chain, the creators of an innovative 
technology root a new block chain in the main Bitcoin block chain through 
Bitcoin contracts, which permit the automated exchange of the sidechain 
currency back into the main block chain. 
Consider a company that wishes to develop a new, faster block chain. 
The company cannot merely create tokens based on the main Bitcoin block 
chain, since those new transactions will only be processed at the speed of 
the main chain—one block every ten minutes. Instead, the company might 
create a new and faster block chain, but one that is grounded in and 
convertible to the main block chain through preprogrammed Bitcoin 
contracts. If the new currency flops because, for example, the innovation is 
not attractive to users, then those users who did invest in the alternative 
currency can convert their holdings back into Bitcoins on the main block 
chain. Side-chains therefore significantly reduce the cost of innovation. 
Tokenizations and side-chains each offer the possibility of building a 
large range of applications on top of a single, powerful block chain. While 
diverse applications built on the same network spur growth and innovation, 
the multiplicity of interconnected use cases presents a serious problem for 
regulators. The following section discusses a number of the different 
emerging use cases for block chain technologies, as well as some of the 
currently developing regulatory responses. 
C.  USE CASES AND REGULATORY REGIMES 
The regulatory framework that will govern trustless public ledgers is a 
function of the narrative surrounding them. Technologies are created by 
narratives, and they are regulated by narratives.108 Bitcoin is as much 
 
 107. Jon Evans, Bitcoin 2.0: Unleash the Sidechains, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/19/bitcoin-2-0-unleash-the-sidechains. 
 108. See DAVID E. NYE, AMERICA AS SECOND CREATION: TECHNOLOGY AND NARRATIVES OF 
NEW BEGINNINGS 4–11 (2013) (detailing America’s “technological foundation story”); Steven Wilf, 
The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
139, 175–76 (2008) (revealing the conflict between two narratives of intellectual property’s industrial 
pluralism in the New Deal); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle 
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driven by a social narrative as it is by innovative technology.109 That 
narrative springs from a driving need for online global currency, from a 
sense of technological optimism, and from the still-vibrant story that 
groups can solve their own problems, given low enough transaction 
costs.110 This narrative has fueled a range of powerful alternatives to 
traditional and costly financial structures and payment networks.111 
Conversely, the narrative of criminal uses for online currencies has fueled 
the regulatory push that has overtaken them.112 
Cryptocurrencies can be used to transfer value, even if they are not 
currency per se.113 Because of this, regulators are currently examining 
Bitcoin and like cryptocurrencies almost purely from the perspective of 
financial services regulation.114 The danger is that this could imperil 
innovations built on top of the block chain that do not fit a financial 
services model.115 
While the financial narrative is well established online, the property 
narrative has a much more tenuous foothold. The technological tools are 
already in place to push trustless technologies well beyond their 
cryptocurrency implementation. The current need is for a legal and social 
narrative that can, when combined with extant technology, provoke similar 
development and innovation in other value-transfer systems. 
 
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1645 (2007) (“For [American jurists], patents were not a vestige of 
corrupt political maneuvering, but instead represented the flourishing of a vital, energetic young 
nation.”); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 561 (1998) (discussing how one narrative of DRM technology 
may have limited innovation in the field); Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1752–53 (1988) (examining the narrative behind regulatory takings).  
 109. David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness 
of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 489, 511–22 (2014). 
 110. Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency, SSRN 1 
(May 8, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2294124 (stating that the creators of 
Bitcoin believed that “currency and economic activity can arise spontaneously without centralized 
authority . . . .”). 
 111. See, e.g., Groshoff, supra note 109, at 509–10 (describing one of the first virtual currencies, 
DigiCash, and the impact its failure had on cryptocurrencies). 
 112. See Kaplanov, supra note 5, at 167–69 (discussing the current push for regulation of 
Bitcoin). 
 113. See Farmer, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing that Bitcoin should not be classified as a currency 
or security, but as “something new”). 
 114. See Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 814–20 (discussing various federal and state 
actions addressing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies); Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 
13–18, 33–45 (creating a categorization scheme for virtual currencies and describing the emerging 
European regulatory framework for such currencies, including the potential applicability of a range of 
European financial services laws). 
 115. See Farmer, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing that treating Bitcoin as either a currency or security 
will cause problems). 
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It is worth briefly examining the emerging regulatory framework 
surrounding cryptocurrencies for two reasons. First, it is useful to get a 
sense as to how the features of a given use case drive the regulatory 
response. Second, the financial regulatory response is very likely to 
become tangled with new, non-currency use cases for public ledgers as 
they emerge. This section explores the ways in which cryptocurrency and 
alternative use cases have become tangled as a matter of regulatory focus. 
The following subparts look first at the regulatory regime currently 
governing trustless system architectures before turning to a discussion of 
the property use cases that trustless public ledgers enable. 
1.  Currency and Payments 
Currency, or a substitute thereof,116 is the most prominent current use 
case for trustless architectures. The Internet has long needed something that 
can serve as a decentralized unit of account, store of value, and medium of 
exchange. Trustless public ledgers work well as currency substitutes 
because conveyance of the ledger entry is a transfer of the asset itself. In 
currency systems, the transferor is not trying to transfer something else by 
using the unit of cryptocurrency as a symbol for that other thing. The 
transferor merely transfers the unit by transferring the ledger entry.117 A 
trustless public ledger serves that purpose simply and admirably. 
Cryptocurrency also answers a market need for online cash 
equivalents. Cryptocurrencies improve on the traditional system of cash, 
checks, and cards. Traditional currencies are not sufficiently divisible so as 
to enable the kind of micropayments necessary for many Internet 
transactions,118 and the transfer networks for cash through the financial 
system are too expensive for transactions of only a few cents to be worth 
transferring.119 Cryptocurrencies enable long-distance, low-trust, and low-
cost microtransactions. 
Regulators have chosen to regulate cryptocurrency businesses under 
the payments regulatory framework.  This is because, in addition to serving 
as a currency substitute, ledgers also serve as payment systems: a method 
of settling debts and transferring value from one person to another. Thus, 
 
 116. The terms “currency substitute” and “cryptocurrency” are used to denote the fact that while 
cryptocurrencies are not currencies or money as defined by law, they are still captured under a range of 
statutes that regulate transmission of value. See infra Part I.C.1.a. 
 117. See J.P. & G.T., supra note 52 (describing how bitcoins are transferred). 
 118. For example, microtransactions are a common means of selling high volumes of low-dollar-
value digital items in video games or social networks.  
 119. Grinberg, supra note 7, at 170. 
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the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(“FinCEN”) has spearheaded regulatory efforts surrounding 
cryptocurrencies. FinCEN has the authority to regulate money services 
businesses (“MSBs”) and issue implementing regulations under the Bank 
Secrecy Act.120 FinCEN’s approach has been to deem cryptocurrencies a 
kind of “value that substitutes for currency,” such that businesses 
conducting transfers using cryptocurrency may be drawn into the definition 
of a regulated MSB under the Act.121 
Under FinCEN regulations, an MSB is a non-bank, non-depository 
institution that engages in one of an enumerated list of financial services, 
from check cashing to issuing prepaid access.122 MSBs do not include 
banks, businesses regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or any person who engages 
in one of the enumerated financial services “on an infrequent basis and not 
for gain or profit.”123 Perhaps the broadest sub-category of MSBs is that of 
money transmitters.124 This category includes entities that engage in “the 
acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency 
from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value 
that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means,”125 
or even more loosely, “[a]ny other person engaged in the transfer of 
funds.”126 
 
 120.   Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting (Bank Secrecy) Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–1959, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 5311–5322 (2012)) (granting the Department of the Treasury the power to implement regulations 
under this act); 31 U.S.C. § 310(a) (establishing FinCEN as a bureau within the Department of the 
Treasury); Treas. Order 180-01 (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-
treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx (delegating enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act to 
FinCEN); FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
 121. The hook to virtual currencies lies in the inclusion of “other value that substitutes for 
currency” within the FinCEN regulations. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2012).  
 122. Id. § 1010.100(ff). 
 123. Id. §§ 1010.100(ff)(8)(i)–(iii). 
 124. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5). 
 125. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A). 
 126. Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(B). Typical of complex and repeatedly amended statutory schemes, 
additional and potentially conflicting mentions of money transmission appear elsewhere in the Code. 
For example, for purposes of determining which entities must register with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012) defines a “money transmitting business” as “any other person who 
engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in 
an informal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business in facilitating 
the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions 
system,” and that is not a depositary institution, which is required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 5313. That statute in turn provides guidelines for reporting domestic coin and currency transactions. 
31 U.S.C. § 5313. 
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An MSB must comply with a range of registration, record-keeping, 
and reporting requirements, including know-your-customer obligations and 
suspicious financial activity reporting.127 An entity that fails to do so faces 
regulatory sanctions, as well as potential criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1960 for the operation of an “unlicensed money transmitting business.”128 
Section 1960 defines an unlicensed money transmitting business to include 
“a money transmitting business which affects interstate or foreign 
commerce in any manner or degree and . . . otherwise involves the 
transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to 
have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to 
promote or support unlawful activity.”129 The statute provides for fines and 
imprisonment for up to five years.130 
The definitions of “money transmitting business,”131 “money 
transmitter,”132 and “unlicensed money transmitting business”133 in the 
regulations and criminal statute have created a regulatory thicket that has 
caught multiple issuers of online currency. United States v. e-Gold, Ltd.134 
considered whether the issuer of an online currency operated an unlicensed 
money transmitting business despite the fact that it did not deal in state-
backed currency.135 The court held that the definition of “money 
transmitting business” in 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (the criminal statute) was 
substantially broader than that found under the Bank Secrecy Act or its 
implementing regulations, and as a result, held that any unlicensed 
transmission of money on behalf of the public “by any and all means” was 
a criminal act.136 Thus, for example, in May 2013, the founder and 
operators of electronic currency system Liberty Reserve were indicted on 
money laundering and unlicensed money transmission charges for 
operating an online virtual currency network heavily used by criminal 
organizations.137 The breadth of application of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 seems 
only limited by the idea that an entity must engage in money transmission 
 
 127. Id. § 5330. 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1). 
 129. Id. §§ 1960(b)(1)(a)–(c). 
 130. Id. § 1960(a). 
 131. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a)(1). 
 132. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a). 
 134. United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 135. Id. at 88. 
 136. Id. at 90. See also Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 7, at 822–28 (analyzing the e-Gold 
prosecution and its implications for subsequent cryptocurrencies). 
 137. Sealed Indictment ¶¶ 30–32, United States v. Liberty Reserve S.A., No. 13 Cr. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 28, 2013); Kim Zetter, Liberty Reserve Founder Indicted on $6 Billion Money-Laundering 
Charges, WIRED (May 28, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/liberty-reserve-indicted/. 
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as a business, or at least in more than an isolated fashion. For example, the 
e-Gold court noted: “Section 1960 was designed to tackle large-scale 
operations as opposed to small-scale or individual money transmitters.”138 
Or, as the court in United States v. Velastegui139 noted, “section 1960(a) 
requires that the unlicensed entity be ‘an illegal money transmitting 
business’ . . . which insures that persons or entities cannot be prosecuted 
for a single, isolated transmission of money.”140 
It was against this backdrop that FinCEN issued guidance in mid-2013 
that defined the application of FinCEN’s regulations to persons 
administering, exchanging, or using virtual currencies, with the goal of 
clarifying when businesses or individuals would be subject to regulation.141 
That guidance differentiates between “users,” “administrators,” and 
“exchangers” for purposes of determining who must comply with the Bank 
Secrecy Act provisions falling under FinCEN’s ambit. An “administrator” 
is an entity that issues or controls a virtual currency. A “user” under the 
guidance is “a person that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or 
services.”142 An “exchanger” is “a person engaged as a business in the 
exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other virtual 
currency.”143 Despite FinCEN’s efforts to clarify, there remains significant 
confusion regarding which entities are users and which are exchangers. In a 
trade, one person gives, and the other receives. Thus, for example, a “user” 
can generally only “obtain virtual currency,” as defined by the guidance, 
through the “exchange of virtual currency for real currency, funds, or other 
currency”—the very definition of an exchanger.144 As a result of this 
confusion, many startups are uncertain whether they must seek licensing as 
money transmitters, and many individual users are worried that they may 
be subject to sanction. 
2.  Property 
Thus far, this section has addressed the regulation of cryptocurrencies 
as a payment rail. The technology is not limited to use as a payment 
system, however. Trustless public ledgers are value transfer systems, part 
 
 138. e-Gold, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 90.  
 139. United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 140. Id. at 595 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2012)). 
 141. Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 
Virtual Currencies, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http:// fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.  
 142. Id. at 2–3. 
 143. Id. at 2. 
 144.  Id.  
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of what commenters call the “Internet of Value.”145 Block chains can 
facilitate the transfer of more than mere coins. Trustless technology can 
disintermediate any system that ties an identity to a resource by making 
transfers of the resource to new identities reasonably secure, public, and 
low-cost. This makes it an intriguing technology upon which to base 
property registries. To date, however, property and commodity conceptions 
of block chain technologies are undertheorized and incomplete. 
The costs of getting property theory wrong are significant. Clean 
property rules should reduce information costs. Unfortunately, the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) attempt to treat virtual currency as property for 
tax purposes does not. In 2014, the IRS published a notice regarding tax 
treatment of cryptocurrencies.146 Those rules grew out of the IRS’s prior 
experience with virtual assets in games and social networks, especially 
game currency or social network currency.147 Such assets could be used or 
traded for other digital assets within a virtual environment.148 Thus, for 
example, one might use the virtual gold in an online world to buy a coveted 
item or piece of virtual real estate. In a social network, a user might be 
willing to pay a small amount to decorate a social network page, or to send 
a small gift to a friend through the network.149 
The first virtual currencies were initially restricted in scope precisely 
because their value was grounded in a specific environment.150 One could 
only use virtual gold to buy items or assets in the virtual world that 
generated them.151 Yet by the very fact that those currencies commanded 
assets that people deeply desired, the value of the currencies began to 
spread beyond the virtual worlds or social networks in which they 
originated.152 Just as dollars are used in transactions entirely outside of the 
 
 145. Stan Higgins, Money 20/20 Day 2: Automated Economies and the Internet of Value, 
COINDESK (Nov. 4, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/money2020-day-two-2014/. 
 146. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (Mar. 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
 147. See Virtual Currency Schemes, supra note 15, at 11 (“In connection with the high penetration 
of the internet, there has also been a proliferation of virtual communities in recent years. . . . In some 
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the goods and services they offer, thereby creating a new form of digital money . . . .”). 
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 149. Id. 
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 151. Leah Shen, Who Owns the Virtual Items?, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
 152. Peter M. J. Gross, A History of Virtual Currency: Why Bitcoins Shouldn’t Surprise You, CFA 
INST. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://annual.cfainstitute.org/2014/01/10/a-history-of-virtual-currency-why-
  
836 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:805 
United States, virtual currencies also began to command value outside of 
their worlds or networks of origin. Chinese citizens began using Q-coins, a 
social network currency, to purchase everyday goods and services.153 
Players of multi-million-player online games began to start businesses in 
which they generated virtual gold not to play the games, but for the purpose 
of selling the gold for dollars.154 
As early as 2007, the IRS was aware of the potential for tax avoidance 
through virtual property and virtual currencies.155 If virtual assets could be 
converted to real dollars and back, then ordinary assets could be hidden in 
virtual worlds and payments could be made without showing any gain in 
income. The critical question was how to treat virtual assets that might be 
used purely for play purposes, but which also could be easily sold to other 
players to turn a profit.156 
This tension caused the IRS to hesitate to issue formal guidance. The 
IRS settled instead in 2009 on an informal cash-out rule that looked 
something like the rules for realization of gain upon disposition of 
property, or capital gains.157 If the digital property merely increased in 
value within the virtual environment, no tax liability accrued. As such, 
when users increased their virtual holdings, or their virtual holdings 
otherwise increased in value, they incurred no tax liability. If, however, 
users exchanged virtual assets for dollars, they were liable for the income 
generated as a result. This system protected the broad range of users who 
were simply playing games or purchasing assets within online 
communities, as users who kept their assets and transactions virtual paid no 
tax. This was not a significant concern because almost all such assets 
needed to be exchanged for dollars before purchasing other assets. 
 
bitcoins-shouldnt-surprise-you/. 
 153. Central Bank Threatens to Step into “Virtual Money” Controversy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
(Nov. 16, 2006, 10:35 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/16/content_5337155.htm 
(discussing Q-coin use in China). 
 154. Richard Scott, The Business End of Playing Games, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2007, 2:55 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6592335.stm. 
 155. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL 
IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 15 (2013) [hereinafter GAO VEC REPORT]. 
 156. See Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (arguing that only those who convert virtual items to cash should be taxed on that 
income); Leandra Lederman, “Stranger than Fiction:” Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620, 
1622–24 (2007) (discussing whether receiving online game items should be taxed when only some 
users sell them for profit); Jacqui Cheng, The Taxman Cometh? IRS Urged to Tax Virtual Worlds, 
Economies, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 12, 2009, 11:04 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2009/2009/01/ 
taxpayer-advocate-urges-irs-to-tax-economy-in-virtual-worlds/. 
 157. GAO VEC REPORT, supra note 155, at 1–2. 
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The tenor of the conversation shifted as virtual currencies outgrew 
their origin in games, virtual worlds, and social networks. In 2013, the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report to the Senate 
Committee on Finance on potential tax treatment for virtual economies and 
currencies.158 The GAO report detailed how the IRS could address tax 
treatment of currencies and assets obtained and used within virtual worlds, 
social networks, or games.159 The report noted that while some economies 
used virtual currencies “as a medium of exchange for goods and services” 
within an online environment, such assets “can have economic value 
outside of virtual economies” when traded for dollars.160 Moreover, the 
report noted more recent currencies that “have been developed outside of 
virtual economies as alternatives to government-issued currencies.”161 
Following the GAO report, the IRS issued guidance determining that 
“[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property,”162 and 
as a result, “[g]eneral tax principles applicable to property transactions 
apply.”163 Yet unlike in the game context, where quasi-property treatment 
protected most users who never cashed out from tax liability, the IRS’s 
inelegant election to treat cryptocurrency as property raises transaction and 
information costs. With each exchange of currency, the user must calculate 
gain or loss based on the rise and fall of the cryptocurrency against the 
dollar. Not only must a taxpayer who receives virtual currency as payment 
include it in computing gross income, but the taxpayer must also calculate 
the gain or loss upon exchange of virtual currency for other property.164 
The IRS’s property characterization directly impacts Bitcoin’s use as a 
medium of exchange.165 Based on the guidance, Bitcoin is taxed based on 
the market rise or fall in its value during the period of time that the owner 
held it.166 If the going rate for a Bitcoin was $500 per coin when a 
consumer received .01 of a coin in the morning, and $750 per coin when 
that consumer used that same amount to buy a sandwich and drink at lunch, 
she would have realized $2.50 worth of taxable gain in the intervening 
hour. Treating convertible virtual currency as undifferentiated personal 
 
 158. Id. at 1. 
 159. Id. at 1–2. 
 160. Id. at 1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 146. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166.  See id. (“If the fair market value of property received in exchange for virtual currency 
exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis of the virtual currency, the taxpayer has taxable gain.”).  
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property poses a non-trivial threat to the use of the currency at the low end 
of the microtransactions scale. The requirement to calculate base value and 
gain on every receipt and expenditure made using convertible virtual 
currency significantly raises transaction costs.167 
In sum, new technology raises the possibility for near-frictionless and 
reasonably secure disintermediated property exchange. But careful theory 
is needed if the benefits of these systems and their successor technologies 
are to be realized. The risk is that inelegantly conceived property systems 
will complicate trades by raising information costs. The following part 
therefore draws heavily on the established literature of information cost 
theory in property to develop a framework for understanding the role of 
good property rules in reducing information costs, and the proper design 
parameters for digital property systems in light of that role. 
II.  BITPROPERTY 
The preceding part discussed digital systems that might significantly 
improve upon current methods of tracking and transferring property 
interests. This part starts a conversation about the future of property. In 
doing so, it seeks to address the mystery of digital property: why do we 
truly own so little online? Why has traditional (i.e., non-intellectual) 
property law failed to gain a real foothold in digital environments? What 
conceptual blocks remain in place, preventing the full adoption of online 
property regimes? And what can be done within the realm of theory to 
begin to shift the conversation? 
The core common law areas have taken markedly different paths in 
their transition to online environments. Contract law has made an effortless 
transition to the Internet.168 Electronic contracts are everywhere and 
routinely enforced. Tort law has made a similarly seamless transition.169 
Cyberdefamation is a routine cause of action, and specific online issues like 
cyberbullying or revenge porn are hotly discussed topics, where progress in 
the debate can be discerned.170  
 
 167. See Kashmir Hill, How I Paid My Bitcoin Taxes, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/04/15/how-i-paid-my-bitcoin-taxes/ (discussing the 
burdens of recordkeeping for Bitcoin transactions). 
 168. Rachel S. Conklin, Be Careful What You Click for: An Analysis of Online Contracting, 20 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 325, 329–30 (2008). 
 169. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 
335, 344–49 (2005) (“Instituting website liability for illegal postings has the potential to jumpstart the 
field of cybertorts so that it can develop into an effective social control mechanism for cyberspace.”). 
 170. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday 
Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 93–94 (2012) [hereinafter Fairfield, Mixed Reality] (“Such 
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Yet traditional property law has struggled to find secure footing 
online.171 Traditional property, a system designed through a long tradition 
of common-law deliberation to govern interests in scarce and rival 
resources, did not seem at the time of the rise  of the Internet to be 
immediately applicable to an environment in which many resources were 
neither scarce nor rival. At that time, the critical application of Internet 
technologies seemed to be unlimited duplication of non-scarce and non-
rival information, rather than the frictionless transfer of scarce and rival 
resources. As a result, intellectual property, the law governing non-rival 
resources, became the dominant structure for online assets. Yet this 
structure is enormously inefficient for those who prefer to own rather than 
license. 
For example, a consumer who purchases CDs owns the CDs but does 
not own the MP3s of the same music. Consumers do not own the e-books 
they purchase from Amazon Kindle, even though they would own the same 
books purchased in physical form. Property rights in physical copies of 
copyrighted material are utterly non-controversial. Property rights in digital 
copies of copyrighted material drift in a limbo of digital rights management 
technologies (“DRM”) and end user license agreements.172 No one can 
accuse intellectual property of being under-examined. Not so with the law 
of digital, rival property. 
Traditional property law has long leveraged the physicality of assets 
as a proxy for the rivalrousness that buyers and sellers demand in property 
systems. The reason that one owns a table rather than purely licensing it 
from its creator is that the table’s physicality makes it (for the most part) 
rival. It is easier to buy a table from someone than to duplicate it through 
copying. But, while physicality has been a proxy for necessary 
rivalrousness, it is only a proxy. What is necessary is that property be rival, 
not that property be physical. Ledgers provide the necessary rivalrousness 
with no requirement of physicality. Yet the rough dividing line between 
property and intellectual property law remains the false boundary of 
physicality. 
 
reputational harms can already be found in the purely online context.”). 
 171. See Elizabeth Townsend Gard & Rachel Goda, The Fizzy Experiment: Second Life, Virtual 
Property and a 1L Property Course, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 915, 931–34 
(2008) (discussing an example of the struggle to apply traditional property law to the online digital 
environment). 
 172. See Fairfield, Mixed Reality, supra note 170, at 100–01 (explaining that there is a trend 
towards corporate control, which increases the risk that “‘virtual’ rights holders (IP owners) will prevail 
and that ‘real’ rights holders (real people and owners of physical property) will lose out”). 
  
840 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:805 
There have been previous attempts at creating theory bridging the 
physicality divide in property law, but these approaches have not fared 
well. For example, the specific literature on cyberproperty attempted to tie 
online property rights to offline chattel property rather than create digital 
assets that are rivalrous in their own right.173 Under cyberproperty theory, 
if I can legally prevent someone from entering my house or interfering with 
my use of my car, I ought to be able to exclude someone from the physical 
property consisting of my computer server. By extension, therefore, the 
cyberproperty literature asks whether a business can extend its property 
interest in its physical servers to a quasi-property right, enabling it to 
exclude users from electronically accessing that server.174 For example, a 
company might raise a cybertrespass claim to exclude unpermitted access 
that generates high load on the company’s servers.175 
Cyberproperty has not been broadly successful as a theory.176 
Ownership of physical hardware has nothing to do with the information 
that is stored on those servers.177 The owners of the two interests are almost 
 
 173. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 88 (2003) (discussing 
“whether technological changes could ever lead us to abandon the presumption that a deliberate trespass 
counts as a private wrong,” and arguing that this rule offers insufficient protection against “electronic 
snooping”); Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164–78 (2004) (exploring 
“how the law should treat legal claims by owners of Internet-connected computer systems to enjoin 
unwanted uses of their systems”); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 23–43 
(2007) (examining the history and development of cyberproperty); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, 
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (focusing on the 
debate over property rules in the technology law context); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 459, 470 (2006) (noting that there is an “overlap between contract claims and concepts of 
property”); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 521 (2003) (“Instead of 
concluding that cyberspace is outside of the physical world, courts are increasingly using the 
cyberspace as place metaphor to justify application of traditional laws governing real property to this 
new medium.”); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of 
an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 586–87 (2001) (analogizing website addresses 
and real property); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace As Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439, 445 (2003) (“The application of the cyberspace as place metaphor within the 
criminal system is neatly reflected in the application, within the civil sphere, of the tort of ‘trespass to 
chattels’ in cyberspace.”). 
 174. See sources cited supra note 173. 
 175. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003) (ruling on a claim of trespass 
filed by Intel against a former employee who sent mass emails using Intel’s email system and 
determining that email communications that did not substantially impair the function of Intel’s system 
did not constitute trespass to chattel).  
 176. See Lastowka, supra note 173, at 53 (“[L]ocating those property rights exclusively in the 
hands of chattel owners is not efficient.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 20, at 1052–57 (discussing types of virtual 
property, all of which have nothing to do with physical hardware); Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-
Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1499 (2008) (explaining the proliferation of user-
generated content). 
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never the same. Most servers are now virtual. Information is constantly in 
motion between server farms located in completely different parts of the 
world.178 The servers are often maintained by third parties.179 Digital 
resources are no longer tied to any particular physical asset from which a 
property interest might be bootstrapped.180 The attempt to do so merely 
privileges those few companies that still maintain their own server farms. 
The limits of cyberproperty theory demonstrate the need for well-
conceived online property systems. There is every reason to believe that the 
degree of rivalrousness created by trustless public ledgers can restore the 
balance between intellectual and traditional property online. In a block 
chain, a slot in the ledger cannot be copied and cannot be duplicated. In 
solving the double-spending problem, trustless public ledgers offer a 
solution to the copying dilemma that has so hounded online property 
interests. The difficulty is that the technology has developed late, after a 
hybrid contract and intellectual property regime has become broadly 
accepted as governing even discrete and rival digital assets. 
Done well, digital property could serve as a mainstay for consumer 
rights online.181 Badly theorized digital property rules will not empower 
new owners in new spaces, but will merely act as a tool for extracting the 
benefits of the online environment for those with greater bargaining 
power.182 Bad online property regimes increase information and other 
transaction costs and intensify unequal bargaining relationships. Compare, 
for example, the difference in bargaining power between Amazon and 
Kindle customers under the current anemic property regime for e-books 
with the relationship that would exist if customers held enforceable 
ownership rights in their book collections. Under the current regime, 
Amazon’s power to revoke a person’s entire online library in the event of a 
licensing dispute is merely a modernized version of the core 
unconscionability at issue in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.183 
 
 178. See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 577, 635 (2003) (“Many copyright owners . . . will make regular backup copies of their works and 
store multiple backup copies in different locations.”). 
 179. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 20, at 1081–82. 
 180. See sources cited supra note 177. 
 181. See Peter Lyman, The Article 2B Debate and the Sociology of the Information Age, 13 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1079 (1998) (“While the Article 2B debate focuses on the rights of the 
owners of digital property, it pays little attention to consumers’ use of information, consumers’ rights, 
and consumers’ access to possible sources of economic power.”). 
 182. See Bob Wright, Technology and the Rule of Law in the Digital Age, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 705, 708 (2005) (“[T]he economic argument against digital theft . . . ––as 
compelling as it is to business leaders––is remarkably ineffectual with the public.”). 
 183. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 250 F.2d 445, 448–49 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
  
842 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:805 
What is obvious unconscionability when applied to personal property 
escapes notice when structured as an intellectual property license. 
Additional theory is necessary to support a shift from the current 
hybrid contract and intellectual property regime to one that recognizes 
clean digital property interests.184 The advent of block chain technology 
creates an opportunity to engage in this much-needed conceptual work. 
This part therefore offers a potential conceptual reboot for online property. 
It asserts that there is a serious need for robust online property interests that 
are neither tangible nor intellectual property. It offers a new view of 
property interests that may provide a more promising foundation for the 
future development of digital property law. 
A.  PROPERTY AS A LAW OF INFORMATION 
Property has been variously conceptualized as the fruits of labor,185 a 
means of anchoring personal identity,186 or a way to maximize social 
 
 184. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 133 (“Despite the fact that the way 
persons communicate and do business has changed dramatically in the past fifteen years, we still lack 
an adequate vocabulary with which to describe intangible assets. With changes in business inevitably 
come changes in property rights and the business changes that developed with the growth of the Internet 
have similarly created a demand for new property rights.”). 
 185. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 301 (1988) 
(“[A]lthough one cannot physically possess or occupy ideas, property in ideas is justified because 
people ‘have the right to enjoy the fruits of their labor, even when the labors are intellectual.’”); Wendy 
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (“[O]ther courts have extended common law 
protection to intangibles on the Locke-like ground that no entity should ‘reap where it has not sown.’”); 
Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking 
the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 739 (1990) (discussing Locke’s labor theory of value); 
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, 
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1388–89 (1989) (“Many theorists, including John 
Locke, have attempted to justify dominion over property as an out-growth of rights over one’s personal 
self, and an argument of that sort might also be used to justify intellectual property.”); Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1381–82 
(2000) (discussing the distinction between a labor-desert theory of property and a utilitarian theory); 
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 
517–22 (1990) (“If, as Locke intimated, labor were all that was necessary to give a person a natural 
right of property in an unowned object, then perhaps an individual’s labor would be sufficient to make 
the ocean her private property.”); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1215 (1998) (“[P]roperty rights can and should be shaped so as to help foster 
the achievement of a just and attractive culture.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, 
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 665, 676 (1992) (explaining that Locke’s theories had “a powerful effect in intellectual property 
and did much to legitimate the belief that ownership rights in speech originated deep in natural law and 
resounded with moral authority”). 
 186. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
(exploring the relationship between property and identity); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 
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welfare through efficient allocation of resources in markets.187 Each 
approach has had significant explanatory power for some property interests 
in some contexts. Yet no currently extant theory has provided an adequate 
foundation for bringing the virtues and values of property to the Internet.188 
Grant Gilmore stated the problem succinctly: “Even for a lawyer, the ‘what 
is property?’ problem presents no difficulty when you are dealing with 
goods, chattels, things: if you can see it, count, weigh and measure it, it 
exists; if you can’t, it doesn’t. But intangible claims are another matter 
entirely.”189 The consequences of the failure of property theory to 
 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852, 1903–36 (1987) (discussing market-inalienability based on a 
conception of personhood or “human flourishing”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1240–44 (1996) (discussing personal identity as a justification for broad 
copyright protection); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 
DUKE L.J. 383, 488 (1999) (“As we have seen, . . . a Kantian right of publicity can be more expansively 
conceptualized as a property right grounded in human freedom . . . . It is true that enforcing publicity 
rights represents a value judgment that objectifications of personal identity constitute private 
property.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1485 (1989) 
(“Such a ‘personhood’ approach would hold that the opportunity to exchange rights for benefits 
wrongly commodifies rights. Especially when the government benefit comes in the form of money, but 
even when it is in kind, the condition attaches a price to the right surrendered—a value in exchange.”); 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 364 (1989) (discussing a personal right to privacy); C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to 
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747 (1986) (“The personhood function of 
property is to protect people’s control of the unique objects and the specific spaces that are intertwined 
with their present and developing individual personality or group identity.”); Justin Hughes, “Recoding” 
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 924 (1999) (“In the last 
few years, this generally pro-property personhood theory has been met with a scholarly reply specific to 
intellectual property: that owners’ rights to control their intellectual property are really rights about who 
controls social meaning.”). 
 187. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 44 (2004) (“An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility . . . when the 
tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it” 
(quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12–
13 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970))); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of 
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1222–23 (1999) (“[W]hen resources are wasted in a tragedy of 
the anticommons, protecting fragments of ownership does not serve the plausible economic goals of a 
private property regime.”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (discussing the “rise of the view among modern legal 
economists that property is simply a list of use rights in particular resources”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 347–48 (1996) (discussing copyright’s 
importance to democratic civil society); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of 
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1867 (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, The Morality of 
Property] (discussing morality and property rights); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and 
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LE GAL STUD. 95, 102, 142–
43 (1997). 
 188. John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) 
of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 82–83 (2011). 
 189. Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 132 (quoting Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What 
It Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300, 301 (1966)). 
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adequately account for rival and intangible property interests have been 
significant: an online ecosystem in which consumers control little and own 
even less. 
This section proposes to bridge the physicality divide in property law 
by asserting that property rights are best understood as information and that 
property systems are ones in which the form of the property as well as the 
means of its transfer are methods of conveying information. This section as 
a whole argues that property is not the law of things (at least insofar as 
thing-ness implies tangibility), but is instead a law of information that 
conforms to identifiable rules of information management and flow. 
Although current theory does not conceive of property as pure 
information, there has been much important thinking on the information 
costs of different property forms and rules. Property is, under the view of 
the information cost literature, an emergent product of the informational 
characteristics of property forms. Specifically, property forms are a 
function of the information that such forms convey to owners and third 
parties. Through these forms, owners know what they can do with 
resources, and third parties know what they cannot do. Communicating 
which parties may do what with which resources at the lowest cost is 
property’s project. 
The following subparts therefore first consider information cost theory 
before discussing a potentially useful addition to that theory. Where prior 
theory has analyzed property in terms of information costs, this Article 
takes the next natural step and treats property itself as an information 
system. 
1.  Property and Information Cost Theory 
Henry Smith and Tom Merrill have spearheaded renewed interest in 
examining the information characteristics of property forms. Smith and (to 
some extent) Merrill object to the “bundle of sticks” view of property on 
the grounds that removal of a stick from the bundle disrupts the 
fundamental informational clarity of the thing.190 In their terminology, if I 
buy a bicycle for which I have all the sticks except the right to ride it on 
Tuesdays, the fundamental integrity of the bicycle as a thing that one may 
buy, sell, use, and exclude others from using is damaged.191 Others will 
 
 190. Merrill & Smith, The Morality of Property, supra note 187, at 1851. 
 191. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–28 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus 
Clausus] (illustrating how creating property rights imposes “measurement costs . . . on strangers to the 
title”).  
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have to engage in expensive investigation to determine whether the bicycle 
they are about to buy can be ridden on Tuesday or whether that right has 
been quietly sold.192 Thus, the removal of the property “stick” 
compromises the informational integrity of the object.193 
Instead, Merrill and Smith proposed that property can best be 
explained as the process of optimizing property rights by reducing 
information costs for search, verification, or transfer. The literature can be 
divided into two parts. First, Merrill and Smith addressed the range of 
property forms. This is termed the numerus clausus: the notion that the 
range of property forms should be a predetermined and closed set.194 
Second, as Smith has recently written, individual packages of property 
rights move more smoothly in the stream of commerce when they are 
cleanly delineated and modular, so that each module can, like legal legos, 
be transferred or rearranged into new and useful forms with minimum 
transaction costs.195 This subpart addresses each in turn. 
The numerus clausus, meaning “the number is closed,” is a principle 
limiting the number of property forms.196 Parties are not free to vary the 
form of property by contract. If parties attempt to create a new property 
form, the rights are recognized as contractual but do not bind third parties 
 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194.   Id. at 4. 
 195.  See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1175, 1187 (2006) [hereinafter Smith, Modularity in Contracts] (clarifying the role of 
modularity in reducing transaction costs). 
 196. Johnson v. Whiton, 34 N.E. 542, 542 (Mass. 1893) (“A man cannot create a new kind of 
inheritance.”); Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in 
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 243–44 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 
1987); Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 4, 13 (“[C]ourts enforce the numerus 
clausus principle strictly (although not of course by name) in the context of estates in land.”); Richard 
A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1 (2005); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 515, 541 (2013); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 790 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract]; Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the 
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 (2002) (arguing that the numerus clausus doctrine 
aids verification of ownership rather than serving to standardize property forms); Henry E. Smith, 
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as would a property interest.197 
Merrill and Smith’s answer as to why property law should be so 
constrained, at significant cost to the satisfaction of individualized 
preferences, is that the limitation of form creates information cost 
savings.198 Constrained choice means lower search and verification costs. If 
the savings generated by a reduction in information costs are greater than 
the efficiency loss engendered by constraining choice, the limitation on 
forms increases social welfare.199 Consider buying batteries. If there were 
only one kind of battery, then purchasing a battery would be simple. The 
more kinds of batteries there are, the more effort one must invest in 
determining the correct battery to purchase. 
Choice raises information costs. It also increases satisfaction. The 
question is how to best balance the range of choice that increases individual 
satisfaction with the information costs increased by that range. This is an 
optimization exercise.200 Increased choice beyond a certain point (see: 
cable channels in the United States) does not increase human happiness. 
Overly constrained choice (see: television channels in Germany) decreases 
the degree of fit between human desire and result, which decreases utility. 
The numerus clausus as envisioned by Merrill and Smith is a principle 
of data management. It sets requirements for data format through its 
restrictions on property forms.201 Consider property as a check-box 
menu.202 One must select the property type: leasehold (subcategories: term 
of years, periodic tenancy, tenancy at will, and tenancy at sufferance),203 
freehold (subcategories: fee simple absolute, determinable, subject to 
condition subsequent, subject to executory limitation), life estate, future 
interest, or limited right (subcategories: easements, covenants, servitudes, 
profits). Those transactions in which the proper datafields are correctly 
entered pass with minimum friction through the system and are enforced by 
courts. Those which do not are not enforced against third parties, although 
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they may be enforced contractually. 
Merrill and Smith’s view that increased range of property formats 
increases data costs to third parties has not gone untested. In offering a 
critique of Merrill and Smith, Hansmann and Kraakman ask why the 
addition of marginal novel property forms would necessarily impact pre-
existing forms.204 For example, the fee simple absolute might not become 
more confusing as a property form just because a new and different form 
was added to the list of forms. One answer to this criticism is that new 
forms dilute the informational clarity of existing forms because a non-
transacting party does not know which form she is receiving ex ante and 
must investigate.205 This answer is, however, slightly too simple. Beyond a 
certain basic number of forms, the addition of marginal forms is unlikely to 
increase information costs as much or even at all. A more developed 
version of the criticism would be, therefore, that the addition of each 
marginal additional form of property does not linearly increase information 
costs.206 As soon as there are two property forms, the need to verify the 
form of the property obtains. Once someone must check to verify the form 
of the property anyway, additional, marginal possibilities for that form 
raise transaction costs much less. The information cost difference between 
one and two forms of property is significant. The information cost 
difference between the thousandth and the thousand-and-first form of 
property is not. 
2.  Property, Information, and Modularity 
The second major line of thought in considering the information 
characteristics of property is the question of modularity, or how cleanly the 
information of a property form is packaged, and how smoothly each piece 
of property or property right interfaces with each other piece or right. The 
modularity discussion is highly salient to the project advanced here: 
developing a system for securely transferring property interests in the form 
of packets of information. For digital property to attract users, it must offer 
discrete, well-defined, constrained, and simple sets of rights. 
Information costs can be reduced not only by limiting the range of 
property forms, per the numerus clausus, but also by optimizing the data 
characteristics of a particular property form by making it modular. The 
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numerus clausus discussion, above, focused on eliminating additional 
property forms that impose search and verification costs on owners, 
potential third parties, creditors, and others. The modularity discussion is 
conceptually distinct.207 The focus is not on novel property forms that 
expand the range of options through which third parties must search, but on 
the packaging of information about property such that there are constrained 
and clear information inputs and outputs.208 
Modularity is a function of what Smith calls “nearly decomposable” 
systems.209 That is, modules encapsulate complexity, and interface points 
between modules are chosen for their simplicity. Modularity creates 
simplicity by breaking problems up, encapsulating repeated and complex 
interactions together, and then creating a neat and clean interface for the 
rest of the system. 
Modularity is both a method of information transfer and an 
information cost reduction strategy. Someone seeking to use the system 
need only deal with, change, or modify one module at a time. Consider the 
common practice of cleaning a messy room by putting toys away in a box. 
The same chaos reigns inside the box that previously affected the entire 
room. Yet the packaging of the box has made the mess modular.210 The box 
fits on a spot on the shelf. If a child seeks a specific toy and the boxes are 
properly labeled, she need only search through the single box rather than 
destroy the room searching through all the toys. Once the single toy is 
found, the box can go back on the shelf, and the room is again clean.211 
Or, consider the modular design of a car. Those parts that are 
sufficiently tightly connected to one another are fitted together into a unit. 
Complexity is contained with the unit, and outputs and inputs of the unit 
are simplified. A given part that fails (usually my water pump) can be 
removed and replaced without disrupting the entire system, since any unit 
that performs that function and matches the inputs and outputs can be 
 
 207. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 195, at 1176 (“[M]odularity is a device to 
deal with complexity by decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), in which 
communications . . . are intense within the module but sparse and standardized across modules.”); 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 1403 (2009) (discussing standardization and innovation through the concept of modularity). 
 208. See Smith, Modularity in Contracts, supra note 195, at 1180 (“Forming a modular system 
involves partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing these encapsulated components to 
interconnect only in certain ways.”). 
 209. Id. at 1196. 
 210. See id. at 1176. 
 211. See id. at 1180 (“[A]djustment can happen within modules without causing major ripple 
effects.”). 
  
2015] BITPROPERTY 849 
exchanged for any other. Or, for those who build their own computers, 
consider the modularity of RAM sticks. Enormous numbers of tiny parts 
are layered together and given one clean interface with the rest of the 
system. The complexity of the RAM stick is contained and packaged 
neatly, so that a user need only slot the stick into the computer. 
Modularity, like the numerus clausus, helps to explain property 
characteristics and forms in terms of information costs. To this point, the 
literature of information cost theory has done critical work setting the stage 
for a theory of property as information. But current theory does not 
sufficiently theorize property itself as information. Even the information 
cost view of property remains strongly tied to physical objects. Remaining 
bound to the physicality and tangibility of property poses a barrier to the 
effective use of information cost theory to ground a robust and working 
system of online property, as the next subpart explores. 
3.  Property Is a Law of Information, Not Things 
If one accepts that information theory is central to the understanding 
of property, the next step is to understand that property is itself an 
information system. Extant theory on information costs in property pulls up 
short, recognizing the importance of information to property forms without 
recognizing that property forms are themselves information. Instead, the 
information cost literature doubles down on the concept of property as the 
law of things. For example, Smith writes: “I argue that the baselines that 
property furnishes, as well as their refinements and equitable safety valves, 
are shaped by information costs. For information cost reasons, property is, 
after all, a law of things.”212 Thus, “[a]n ‘in rem’ right originally meant a 
right ‘in a thing,’ and [Smith argues] that it is the mediation of a thing that 
helps give property its in rem character—availing against persons 
generally.”213 In this sense, the law gives a “special respect . . . to physical 
objects [because] the objects themselves provide an excellent form of fixed 
rule. The contours of an object . . . establish a boundary that is highly 
resistant to revision in a particular dispute.”214 
Treating property as the law of things, at least without a more nuanced 
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idea of the informational role of thing-ness in property law, would be a lost 
opportunity. The risk is that any enhanced understanding of the 
informational role of property would be limited to tangible things. The old 
trouble would return: property law would continue to inadequately address 
intangible property rights that do not fit squarely within intellectual 
property law and would leave traditional property theory with no 
conceptual approach that fits naturally in online environments. The next 
subpart therefore engages the argument that property is the law of things. It 
proposes a friendly amendment to the extant literature. Properly 
understood, “thing-ness” in property law need not exclude online or digital 
objects. (Indeed, Smith suggests such a tack in passing.)215 Things are just 
one subset of information objects. To see this clearly, it is useful to 
distinguish between a thing and an information object, discussed below. 
a.  Thing-ness in Property Law 
For Smith, thing-ness is essential to modularity.216 Ownership rights 
in a thing may be complex, but that complexity need not reach third parties. 
Consider Blackacre.217 Property rights between owners may be complex—
interest holders may be remaindermen, joint tenants, renters, or any one of 
a range of other possibilities, yet all the potential third party trespasser need 
know is to keep out. As Merrill comments on Smith: 
The proverbial Blackacre presents a simple rule of exclusion insofar as 
the audience of strangers is concerned, a complex of formal rules when 
potential transactors enter the picture, and a potentially limitless diversity 
of rules and norms when the relevant audience consists of insiders such 
as co-owners.218 
Essential to Smith’s conception is the idea of a thing. Blackacre as a 
thing carries informational content. The land in this example serves as a 
proxy for the significant complexity going on inside the property form. A 
potential trespasser need not become embroiled in the machinations of 
interest holders in the property; she need only know that to enter another’s 
land without permission is trespass. 
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Yet here the argument for thing-ness, at least in the purely physical 
sense, fails. The metes and bounds of Blackacre are not necessarily 
physical, they are informational. Blackacre does not, properly understood, 
exist apart from the information that defines its existence. The rocks, trees, 
and land exist, of course, but they are not Blackacre. Blackacre is 
comprised of information delineating and demarcating the land. There is 
usually no physical line that demarcates the property from neighboring 
land. Thing-ness is simply information about the limit of rights. This is true 
even when there is an objectively discernable physical boundary to 
property. To take an example from chattel property: if I own a small 
framed picture, I might own 1’ x 2’ of painted canvas. If I own a larger 
picture, I may own 2’ x 3’of painted canvas. The limit of the frame and the 
concept that the picture is a unified “thing” (even though it is a composite 
of paint, medium, backing, frame, and wire) serve to limit information 
costs and make the picture modular, easily transferrable, sellable, and so 
forth. 
An overemphasis on physical rather than informational thing-ness 
interferes with the information theory of modularity. Modules manage 
complexity by packaging interrelated parts together.219 Those parts are 
often themselves modules. Thus, a car is a module, but the parts of which it 
is made are also modules. Smith notes this expressly as one of the strengths 
of modularity in property: that property modularity allows the creation of 
nested structures through limited recursion.220 But it also means that 
“thing-ness” is itself something of a false construct. The thing-ness of a car 
is decomposable to the thing-ness of its parts, which are in turn 
decomposable to the thing-ness of components, which are of course 
themselves further decomposable. “Thing-ness,” in the tangible sense, does 
not tell us which thing, the component, the part, or the car, is the 
fundamental unit of property. To mistake thing-ness, especially familiar 
physical thing-ness, for the sine qua non of property, instead of the 
information properties thing-ness represents, would sap much of the 
strength of information cost theory as applied to property.  
Rather, the same techniques of managing information costs by 
constraining search costs and managing complexity by providing interface 
points of constrained information inputs and outputs are the bedrock of 
coded environments. These principles are not about thing-ness at all. 
Instead, thing-ness is one way among many to manage information flow by 
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creating simple interfaces between data modules. It should be possible to 
usefully amend information theory in property so as to preserve its value in 
creating digital property systems. The following subpart therefore 
addresses how information systems manage informational complexity 
through modularity, before drawing some insights from information system 
design for property rules. 
b.  Object Oriented Programming 
Property is not the law of things, it is the law of data objects, whether 
those objects are transferred by physical exchange or by changing a ledger 
entry in a database.221 One way to see this is by analogy to computer code. 
Code is a chain of logic, in which one action is logically defined along a 
specific path, to lead to another action. Code can be written with long, 
untrimmed chains of input and output variables, in which each action is tied 
to numerous other actions. This tangle of logic is often referred to as 
“spaghetti logic.” Such code does not manage complexity by limiting and 
simplifying the interface points between different parts of the code. 
Better-designed code creates “objects” that act, in an informational 
sense, like Smith’s “things,” although they have no tangible or physical 
component. An object in code is a package of functions that produces a 
simplified output useable by the rest of the system. For example, imagine a 
system designed by a bank to determine whether to make a loan to a 
customer. One might design code that ties each input to each output—the 
effect of the economy on the client’s future income, for example. The result 
might be very accurate but also complex and difficult to change. A 
different way of organizing the code would be to write one module, or 
object, that would package all of the relevant factors together and spit out 
one number: the interest rate at which it is currently profitable for the bank 
to extend loans. Any number of considerations might go into such a 
determination, yet the module spits out a single number. That number, then, 
is the interface with other modules in the system. Those modules need not 
recreate the entire sequence of logical manipulations that the interest rate 
module did, they merely need to call the output variable of the interest rate 
module. In the same way, the customer’s ability to pay might be a function 
of a range of different variables reduced to a single number. That number, 
too, can be passed to the rest of the system. The value in separating these 
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modules out is that if one needs to change a component, one can do so 
without disrupting many ties throughout the system. By intentionally 
bottlenecking information flow between modules, a coder can ensure that a 
change in one internal function does not disrupt the entire system. One 
need not chase down every end of every tangled piece of logical spaghetti. 
Modularity is, in a way, inefficient. It may be that a direct connection 
between general economic bellwethers and income might produce a more 
accurate estimate of income. Coders might be tempted to kludge 
connections between every relevant input and the output they seek. But in 
doing so, they lose the organizational structure of the code that makes it 
easy to understand, maintain, pass on, swap out, and most of all reuse in 
other coding environments. Once a good code object has been created, it 
can be swapped out like a Lego piece to build entirely different structures. 
c.  Object Oriented Property 
“Things” in property, like objects in code, are packages of closely 
related data functions. Property systems and forms do not directly convey 
physical assets, they convey packages of information. Property law does 
not simplify things (at least not directly), it simplifies information flows. 
Thus, property is the law of data objects, not the law of physical things. 
Physicality of course creates certain data characteristics (uniqueness, 
rivalrousness, persistence, and the delineation of a package of rights as tied 
to the delineation of the “thing”) as natural byproducts, but we do not need 
physicality to create clean data objects. Coders do not rely on tangible 
thing-ness at all when they create modules that constrain information flow 
to make the code more manageable. In the same way, digital objects do not 
need physical thing-ness to benefit from the virtues of a property system. 
Constraining and modularizing property forms ensures that the 
information at the core of property is packaged in a way that can be moved 
smoothly through the stream of commerce. But it is possible to mistake 
these features for the point. For example, Merrill expresses concerns about 
the modularity approach to property because it “fails to explain the limited 
number of legal forms in which property can be held—the numerus clausus 
principle.”222 It certainly does not, but this does not matter. Modularity 
does not cause or explain the numerus clausus. Both the numerus clausus 
and modularity proceed from the same principle: property is information. 
Indeed, both the numerus clausus and modularity cease to be property 
principles when they conflict with principles of efficient information flow. 
 
 222. Merrill, supra note 217, at 154.  
  
854 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:805 
For example, Smith discusses recursion: the ability to reuse modules in a 
nested form to create new property structures (such as parts in a car, noted 
above).223 However, recursion does not always reduce information costs. 
Recursion can increase complexity when it is unlimited. Consider, as an 
example of unbounded recursion, the famous wish for more wishes. While 
the ability to do again what a system has done before is a core function of 
automation, recursion is not an unlimited positive in information theory. It 
is famously simple to trap information systems in an infinite loop with 
recursion. Although the trope of Captain Kirk confusing a computer 
adversary by posing a logical loop is campy,224 it conveys an underlying 
truth: long or infinite recursive loops can damage and delay information 
systems. The same is true for property systems. Recursive forms like the 
fee tail have been abandoned, and rules against dead-hand control, such as 
the rule against perpetuities, limit the grantor’s ability to recursively “reset” 
ownership of land. Property systems, like other information systems, 
protect themselves by limiting the number of times a recursive loop can run 
on the system. 
Property shares the considerations of object oriented programming 
and many of its tools for managing information flow. The guiding principle 
is one of information management: of rapid, effective, secure, and 
verifiable information flow based on property forms. The next section 
therefore bears down on this element of property: that property law forms a 
protocol for the transmission, security, and verification of information, at 
reduced cost. Or, more simply, if property is information, property systems 
are information protocols. 
B.  THE PROPERTY PROTOCOL 
The value of information cost analysis of property extends well 
beyond property forms, to the system for conveying and verifying property 
information. This section therefore outlines some principles of information 
design that might further enable property systems to do the job of 
conveying the core information of property at lower cost with increased 
certainty. 
If property is information, property systems are a protocol for 
communicating, verifying, and protecting that information. To transfer land 
from one person to another, one must transfer the information (the deed) 
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that identifies the transaction (sale or ownership) and ties the successor 
identity (buyer) to the resource (the land). To buy an MP3, one must record 
the information (on a watermark or license server) that identifies the 
transaction (license) and ties the successor identity (the consumer) to the 
resource (the music). To generate a security interest, one must record the 
information (in a UCC filing) that identifies the transaction (security 
interest) and ties the secured party (usually the bank) to the resource (the 
debtor’s collateral). 
The traditional definition of property as the relationship of actors to 
assets and to each other does not fall far from the mark.225 But the 
traditional definition does not capture the degree to which property systems 
not only require, but are in fact comprised of, information. The key player 
in a property transaction is not the seller or the buyer, but the non-involved 
third party, who is bound by the dispositions made by the negotiating 
parties.226 The directly involved parties of course already have information 
about the deal through their contract negotiations. They need no property 
system to apprise them of the terms of their own deal. That can be handled 
through contract rules designed to foster bilateral information disclosure. 
By contrast, a true property system must deliver information to third 
parties.227 First, non-parties need information about transactions with which 
they are not at all involved. Assume A and B transact in land. Party C 
needs to know the boundaries of the transaction entered into by A and B, 
which constrains where C may hunt or fish.228 Further, non-parties need 
information about transactions with which they are not involved yet. 
Assume C wishes to buy the land from B. She will need information about 
the A-B deal and all earlier deals.229 Finally, C needs access to change the 
information, that is, the records, should she decide to become owner of the 
land.230 The common thread is information. The essence of the property 
system itself is not the identity, asset, or relationship between the parties, it 
is the information about those elements, and the degree to which that 
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information is effectively stored, communicated, and verified. 
Procedures for quickly, effectively, securely and cheaply 
communicating information are, in information parlance, called 
protocols.231 A protocol sets the format for data.232 It sets the procedures 
for transmitting it. It determines to whom certain data should be sent. It sets 
the procedures for error checking and the procedures for confirming that 
the data has been received. It determines the routing procedures for moving 
the data through a network. It sets procedures for lost or missing data. 
I propose that a property system is an information communication and 
storage protocol. There are good protocols—ones that permit maximum 
information flow, accuracy, and security, and cause minimum confusion 
and resistance. There are bad protocols—ones that engender confusion, 
noise, uncertainty, and insecurity. Similarly, there are good property 
systems—ones that permit transactions at high velocity, with high security, 
and with low friction. There are bad property systems—ones that are time 
consuming, costly, insecure, and inaccurate. The virtues are the same, and 
so are the vices. Good property systems transmit information about who 
may do what with which resources rapidly and securely, secure it faithfully, 
and can verifiably reproduce it. Bad property systems fail at each of these 
tasks. 
Conceptualizing property systems as information protocols has 
distinct advantages over extant property theories. As worked out above, 
physical things themselves are not the heart of property.233 The bundle of 
sticks—whether an owner may use, exclude, alienate, or destroy—is not 
the heart of property. Personal identity is not the heart of property. Instead, 
a theory of property as the data consisting of who may take which action 
with respect to what asset, and the procedures for communicating, 
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changing, verifying, and storing that data, cuts closest to the bone. As one 
transaction follows another, forming a chain of title, we create a chain of 
data relating each transaction to the next. The property system resides in 
the procedures for tracking, transmitting, and verifying that information. A 
property system enables transfers by conveying the information about who 
now owns what. A property system enables exclusion—the most 
commonly discussed element of property systems—by relating a what to a 
not-who, that is, the set of people who are barred from making use of a 
resource. 
The received wisdom that traditional property is somehow foreign or 
alien to information environments is incorrect. This error stems from the 
underexplored and incorrect assumption that property is about physical 
things, or about identity, or about specific actions one may take with 
property. Identity, assets, and actions are all important parts of a 
functioning property system, but they are not its substance. The substance 
of property is information. If property systems are information systems, 
then it must be possible to implement them in an information environment. 
To test whether property-as-information-protocol can hold conceptual 
water, it is useful to consider a few of the virtues of good information 
communication and storage protocols, and to observe whether they have 
explanatory power in the property context. Although there are many 
descriptors of good communications protocols, three are discussed here, 
loosely grouped around data at rest before it is sent, data in transit, and data 
at rest after it has been received. The following subparts first describe how 
these characteristics work in information environments before drawing 
parallels to characteristics of property systems. 
1.  Data Formatting 
A major challenge to information systems is ensuring that data follows 
a simple format such that it can be transferred or searched with minimum 
cost. Information can come in an infinite range of forms, some sufficiently 
organized as to be useful to automated systems, and some so disorganized 
as to be useless to anyone. Good data formats include necessary data and 
exclude data—even relevant data—when it appears in a format that makes 
parsing, processing, storage, or later accurate retrieval of the data more 
difficult. A good data format constrains information to the essential fields 
necessary for the transfer, storage, and retrieval of that information. 
Further, the format constrains the range of ways in which information can 
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be entered. It selects a standard.234 Such standards necessarily exclude 
useful but more costly means of presenting information in favor of an 
agreed-upon form. 
The law of property operates as an information protocol in that it sets 
standard formats for data. Assume that there is only one property format: 
FSA (fee simple absolute). Under this regime, there are serious utility costs 
due to constrained ability to satisfy preferences, but there are no 
information costs. The recipient need not inquire as to the form of property 
she receives. Now, assume we add a new hypothetical format: FSB. A 
recipient must now inquire as to whether she is receiving FSA or FSB, and 
costs rise. Here, we see Merrill and Smith’s information cost model at 
work.235 But to incorporate Hansmann and Kraakman’s criticism,236 
assume that we add an additional marginal format: FSC. The costs for 
verifying the format of the property do not change. All that one must do is 
exclude all results that are not FSA. To think of it another way, if one 
desires FSA, one need not bother with all other formats, FSB through FSZ. 
One must check, but as long as labels are clear, it is just as easy to see that 
FSH returns a result of “no, this isn’t what I want,” as it is to see that FSQ 
returns a result of “no, still not what I want.” 
Theorizing the numerus clausus as a data format rule provides a 
friendly amendment to Merrill and Smith’s theory, and addresses the 
critique that, as property forms are added, the marginal additional 
transaction cost steeply declines. The problem is not the total number of 
forms, but the ability to differentiate between forms. Property forms must 
be more than merely a little different; they must be different enough so as 
to be distinguishable. The numerus clausus as amended here is therefore a 
principle of the minimum difference necessary for differentiation. What is 
necessary—and indeed, what property law offers at its core—is a system of 
specific, constrained, parameterized property forms that are detectably 
different from one another at low cost. The dangerous case is one in which 
a given property format (say, FSA2) becomes confused with another (say, 
FSA), such that one can check and still not know what format the property 
takes. Worse is one in which a non-standard property form looks the same 
as a mainstream, common property form on the surface, but is actually 
different due to obscure or hard-to-obtain information. 
 
 234. The term “standard” is used here and throughout this Article in the technical sense of an 
agreed-upon format for the transaction, and not in the legal sense of a fuzzy legal line. 
 235. Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 191, at 27.  
 236. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 196, at 380–81 (arguing that the addition of property 
forms would not necessarily generate a “meaningful degree of confusion”). 
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A theory of property as information resolves much apparent 
contradiction. With Merrill and Smith, I treat information costs as central to 
the law of property. With Hansmann and Kraakman, I note that marginal 
property formats do not linearly increase information costs.237 Finally, I 
build on extant theory by noting that it is the ability to distinguish between 
formats—and not the raw number of forms—that matters in creating a low 
cost and high velocity property system. 
2.  Verification and Error Checking 
Verification is a vital component of information protocols, and by 
extension property systems.238 The value of information lies not merely in 
its content, but also in the degree of certainty that the information was not 
altered or corrupted in transit. Verification matters most if information is to 
be passed further along to another party or another information system, 
further spreading corrupted data. The flip-side of verification rules are 
error-clearing rules. These rules exclude corrupt data so that it does not get 
passed forward. Some error in a one-time transaction does not matter much. 
Matters are different for information that must be passed forward based on 
the prior chain of events. Accumulation of errors within a data chain, just 
like the accumulation of clouds on title in a chain of title, will eventually 
crash an information system or render an asset immobile in the stream of 
commerce because title is too clouded. 
Property systems have extensive error checking rules. For example, 
title searches serve as a form of error checking for title-based systems. The 
purpose of the search is not merely to make sure that the asset is 
sufficiently unencumbered such that the buyer is not buying a lawsuit along 
with her asset, but also to ensure that the information stream attached to the 
asset is itself not so clouded or contaminated that the buyer would have 
trouble selling the property forward.239 Similarly, when courts pay attention 
to flaws in chains of title, they encourage prospective buyers to focus 
attention on the chain of data. Many problems that are fixed as a result of 
 
 237. See generally id. (discussing verification rules in property). 
 238.   Id. at 374, 380. 
 239.  See, e.g., Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. App. 1992) (“[The] grantee under a 
warranty deed, except for matters specifically enumerated therein, should be in much the same position 
as [a purchaser of land with the] right to demand title which will put him in all reasonable security 
against loss or annoyance by litigation and will enable him not only to hold his land but to hold it in 
peace.” (alteration in original) (quoting Fechtner v. Lake Cnty. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 361 N.E.2d 575, 
578 (Ill. 1977))); Chavis v. Gibbs, 94 S.E.2d 195, 197 (Va. 1956) (“The main purpose of recordation 
statutes is to give constructive notice to purchasers and encumbrancers who acquire or seek to acquire 
some interest or right in property.”). 
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title searches are minor errors in the data chain, and clearing up small 
errors prevents aggregation and improves the overall health of the registry. 
Error clearing rules also abound in the law of property. For example, 
rules of many different stripes protecting the rights of bona fide purchasers 
and buyers in the ordinary course of business clear accumulated clouds on 
title.240 These rules operate to insulate current transactions from errors in 
prior transactions. For example, buyer in the ordinary course of business 
rules ensure that when one purchases a flat screen television from Best 
Buy, one need not be concerned with whether Best Buy has granted Bank 
of America a security interest in inventory.241 If a consumer sells the flat 
screen to another consumer, a different flavor of the same rule applies to 
clear other complicating security interests that the seller might have left 
still attached to the property.242 Sales law’s rules for voidable title and 
entrustment ensure that bona fide purchasers for value and buyers in the 
ordinary course are insulated from upstream title conflicts by clearing title 
error in the hands of the purchaser.243 Or consider marketable title acts for 
real estate, which only require a search back up the chain of title for a 
statutory period of years.244 All prior transfers are considered good and do 
not interfere with the registered chain of title. These rules for both real and 
personal property have as many different variants as contexts, but each has 
the salutary function of clearing errors in the chain of title so that mistakes 
in prior transactions do not aggregate to immobilize the asset. 
3.  Data Security 
The third major category is data security.245 Data must be secure both 
in transit and at rest. Data must be routed to the proper recipient and not to 
a third party who fraudulently attempts to stand in the shoes of the sender 
 
 240.  See, e.g., Sender v. Cygan (In re Rivera), 513 B.R. 742, 753 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014) 
(“Colorado is a race-notice state where no unrecorded instrument is valid against a bona fide purchaser 
of the subject property who first records. Consequently, as long as an instrument is properly recorded, 
subsequent purchasers have an obligation to find it at the county clerk and recorder’s office and are 
considered to have constructive notice even if they do not locate it.”); U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (2010) (“[A] 
buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, 
even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.”); id. § 2-403(1) (“A 
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”). 
 241.  Id. § 9-320(a). 
 242.  Id. § 9-320(b). 
 243.  Id. § 2-403. 
 244.  See, e.g., Unif. Marketable Title Act § 3(a) (1990) (“A person who has an unbroken record 
chain of title to real estate for 30 years or more has a marketable record title to the real estate . . . .”). 
 245. There are, of course, other virtues of information protocols, which are excluded here due to 
space constraints. Routing and addressing are major goals of a good transfer protocol. The data must go 
to the party to whom it is addressed.  
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or receiver. The question is whether these values are a core part of the law 
of property. 
Security has always been a feature of property. Gold has always been 
kept in vaults. But the argument that security is a core and integral part of 
property law is less immediately intuitive than it is for data formatting, 
error checking, and error clearing. The security surrounding an asset has 
rarely been directly conceptualized as a key element of the property itself. 
Lack of built-in security has long been a driving factor for property law. 
Developed rules preventing theft, trespass, and conversion are necessary 
because property, especially personal property, is so easy to steal, subvert, 
or convert.246 
The strongest difference between property rules and information 
security principles is that most property rules secure property by ex post 
sanction (against thieves or trespassers), while much of information 
security relies on ex ante exclusion through encryption or access controls. 
The worse ex ante security is, the more costly and developed the ex post 
system for recovering the assets must be.  
As a result of property’s traditionally limited ex ante security, much 
law is concerned with making sure that unauthorized transfers do not 
threaten the information that possession of property conveys to third 
parties. For example, property law strongly sanctions unpermitted 
possession. It is not clear, without more, why it should do so—unpermitted 
possession does the property no harm. One likely answer is that possession 
is a powerful information rule.247 The fact of possession conveys 
information so powerful that the person possessing property is considered 
its owner for the purposes of all but a very few interactions, which are 
based on some superior information source (say, being pulled over by 
police who have run the plates).248 The best way to steal property is to hack 
the property system by impermissibly obtaining possession, thereby 
broadcasting ownership to the majority of people who encounter the thief 
 
 246.  Of course, locks and safes exist, but they weaken a key feature of property, which is the 
ability to use the goods openly without having someone take them. Property that cannot be used while 
being locked up is not much good as property. 
 247.  Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78–79 (1985). 
See also Smith, The Language of Property, supra note 196, at 1117–19 (discussing different possessory 
rules and the informational content they provide to different audiences); Merrill & Smith, 
Property/Contract, supra note 196, at 803 (“[S]ubstantive legal norms associated with in rem rights are 
more likely to be expressed as rules that turn on one or a small number of publicly observable states of 
fact . . . . The common law rule that the person in possession of a resource is presumed to have a 
property right is one example.”). 
 248.  See sources cited supra note 247. 
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with the property. Thus, law sanctions unpermitted possession even if the 
property is unharmed and the owner has not yet missed the property. 
Traditional property principles provide security for information assets 
as well. Consider domain names, which have been recognized by some 
courts as sharing some characteristics with traditional property. In Kremen 
v. Cohen,249 Judge Kozinski wrote for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
Property is a broad concept that includes “every intangible benefit and 
prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.” We apply a three-
part test to determine whether a property right exists: “First, there must 
be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of 
exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have 
established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.” Domain names satisfy 
each criterion.250 
Kremen considered the theft of a domain name obtained by deceiving 
the centralized authority, then Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”), which 
maintained the register of domain name registrations.251 Cohen exploited 
NSI’s lack of security in the domain name ledger to illegitimately transfer 
the valuable domain name Sex.com.252 His approach was low-tech social 
engineering. He sent forged letters and faxes from the original registrant 
claiming that the domain name had been abandoned.253 The effect was a 
simple deletion of a claim on a registry. Once NSI had deleted the 
registration, Cohen snapped up the domain name.254 The effect was to 
transfer a valuable intangible and rival property interest through the 
exploitation of a security loophole (here, NSI’s employees’ credulousness) 
by modifying the ledger. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
should not have rejected Kremen’s claim for conversion, and remanded. In 
so doing, it applied entirely ordinary property rules to a ledger registration 
change.255 
While traditional ex post property sanctions can protect digital 
property, new information security measures, such as advances in public 
 
 249.   Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 250. Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).  
 251. Id. at 1026–27. Kremen also considered the potential liability of NSI for its failure to prevent 
Cohen from taking the Sex.com domain name. Id. at 1028–29. This part of the decision, bearing as it 
does on an Internet intermediary’s responsibility to undertake expensive verification for a cheap 
service, is more controversial, and is not touched upon here except to note that decentralized public 
trustless ledgers ameliorate this problem by reducing the role of intermediaries.  
 252.  Id. at 1026–27. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. at 1036. 
  
2015] BITPROPERTY 863 
ledgers and encryption, can also protect physical property. Consider smart 
property: property that is enhanced with embedded software, and perhaps 
further secured by linking the software to a slot on a block chain.256 Smart 
property (at least in the sense of software-embedded and networked 
property) is becoming the norm for objects usually considered traditional 
personal property. Cars, houses, glasses, and watches are rapidly joining 
smart phones and tablets as being primarily protected by software control. 
A smart car linked to the block chain might “know,” for example, that it is 
owned by the owner of a specific ledger entry, and will only start in the 
presence of the person to whom that ledger entry is ascribed. Keys cannot 
be duplicated because the slots on the ledger are rivalrous. The same 
public-key encryption infrastructure that has long secured information can 
now secure physical property against theft. 
In sum, this part has argued that the conceptual core of property is not 
tangible things, not identity, and not sticks from the bundle, but 
information. As information, property is formatted, transferred, verified, 
and stored through a variety of protocols that share the virtues of good 
information transfer protocols. The rules of property set strong data 
formats, verify data, clear errors, and store information securely against 
manipulation or theft. Viewing property in this way paves the way for an 
actual operational digital property system. The following part offers 
suggestions for how to use trustless public ledger technologies to build 
such a system, as well as addressing challenges to the view of property 
espoused here. 
III.  OPERATIONALIZING BITPROPERTY 
The preceding parts have described a potentially disruptive technology 
for tracking peer-to-peer and decentralized ownership interests, and have 
shown how such technology lays bare the nature of property as 
information. This part offers specific suggestions for how to clear away 
conceptual rubble in order to build a working system of digital property, 
and addresses potential conceptual challenges to the approach offered 
above. 
A.  NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS TO CURRENT THEORY 
A theory of property as information complements existing conceptions 
of property. Under a theory of property as information, the identity of the 
owner, attributes of the asset, or the nature of the relationship are just data 
 
 256.  Ethereum, supra note 94, at 5:33. 
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to be formatted, transferred, verified, stored, and secured by a given 
property system. The property protocol does not dictate the goal of the 
system or transaction, whether that goal be efficiency, productivity, 
ensuring maximum exploitation of resources, or self-actualization. There is 
therefore very little tension, and in fact significant synergy, between other 
accounts of property and an information-based approach. 
Nevertheless, there are some inconsistencies between some views of 
property and a theory of property as information. Property-as-information 
is inconsistent with the contention that legal categorizations in property 
should have anything to do with physicality. For property-as-information to 
take hold as an operative legal theory, property theory must dispense with 
physicality (or, conversely, intangibility) as the characteristic used to sort 
asset categories, and replace it with an analysis of rivalrousness and 
scarcity. Practically speaking, this will mean a rebalancing and reduction of 
the role that intellectual property has played in the online ecosystem. This 
section addresses each in turn. 
1. Disentangling Tangibility 
There are significant conceptual obstacles in the law of property, 
which if unchecked will substantially impede the cost and security gains 
made possible by trustless digital architectures. The first and most 
significant of these is the role that tangibility plays in courts’ 
characterization of assets. As Juliet Moringiello notes, tangibility has long 
stood as a bad proxy for rivalrousness.257 Block chain technology provides 
strong practical evidence against the notion that intangible assets cannot be 
rivalrous. The law of property must definitively abandon the connection 
between tangibility and rivalrousness if property law is to survive the 
transition to online contexts.258 
Tangibility is a bad proxy because it is both imprecise and 
unnecessary. Tangibility stands in for two distinct variables, scarcity and 
rivalrousness. Scarcity is a function of supply and demand. If there is more 
of a thing than people who want it, it is not scarce. Rivalrousness is a 
measure of exclusivity of possession. If person A holds a rivalrous 
 
 257. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 137 (“Despite the fact that individuals 
commonly think of intangible rights embodied in almost worthless tangible things as property, 
intangible rights unconnected to tangible things continue to confound judges.”). 
 258. Id. at 120, 140 (“[T]he category of ‘tangible’ is irrelevant in property law and . . . commercial 
law must discard distinctions based on the physical manifestations of assets and focus instead on the 
legal qualities of those assets . . . . This habit is a harmful one because it directs judges and lawmakers 
to look to intellectual property law rather than property law generally for rules to govern electronic 
assets.”). 
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resource, person B does not. Physical resources can be scarce, rival, 
neither, or both. Air, for example, is physical, but neither scarce nor rival. 
A rock is rival but not scarce. A chance to hear Joshua Bell play in the 
Washington metro is scarce but not rival.259 A gemstone or a bitcoin is 
both. 
Tangibility is therefore a bad substitute for scarcity and rivalry. An 
asset may be rival and tangible, in the form of traditional personal property. 
An asset may be intangible and non-rival, in the form of traditional 
intellectual property. An asset may be intangible, rival, and scarce, as are 
bitcoins. Or an asset may be intangible, rival, and non-scarce, as would be 
entries in a non-capped public ledger. As the following subpart will 
demonstrate, when courts fail to make precise distinctions about scarcity 
and rivalry, and instead rely on the crude proxy of physicality, they both 
wrongly apply intellectual property protections to non-intellectual property 
intangible assets, and deny the protections of basic property law to the 
owners of such digital objects. 
2.  Differentiating Digital and Intellectual Property 
One of the most marked difficulties in the development of online 
commerce has been the failure to develop a distinct theory of digital 
property that can withstand the incursions of intellectual property law.260 
The result is that many consumers own practically nothing online. Where 
they once owned bookcases full of books, consumers now have limited 
access to accounts with Amazon Kindle that can be erased at the whim of 
the copyright holder.261 Where consumers once had record or CD 
collections, they now have nothing upon ending a relationship with a music 
streaming service. 
There are both legal and technological aspects to this failure. The 
technological infrastructure of e-commerce has grown up around an 
ostensible truth of online assets: that because there is supposedly no way to 
prevent duplication of digital assets, any digital rights system must rely on 
a centralized list and list-verification authority to keep track of who may 
access which content. Legally, this centralization was accomplished 
 
 259.  Gene Weingarten, Pearls Before Breakfast, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2007), 
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 260. See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 2, at 141 (“[C]ourts and some scholars tend to 
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through intellectual property rules.262 A central list curator can hold the 
copyrights and issue limited licenses to consumers. This creates a hub-and-
spokes legal framework that fits the perceived need to create and verify a 
centrally maintained list. Given that decentralized ledgers of rival, non-
duplicable interests are practicable, it is time to reexamine whether 
intellectual property remains the best governing law for non-intellectual 
property interests in discrete and rival digital objects. 
Consider an MP3 track. If the track resides on a compact disc, it is 
considered tangible, and its owner gains certain rights from possessing the 
physical disc—for example, the ability to resell the specific copy under the 
first sale doctrine.263 Yet if that track resides on the cloud,264 its 
intangibility is construed by courts as presenting the possibility of infinite 
forward copying, the ultimate non-rivalrousness.265 It does not matter much 
to courts that the MP3 on the CD could be copied forward, nor does it 
appear to matter under current doctrine if an MP3 residing on the cloud 
were not susceptible to forward copying. 
This debate about rivalrousness and intangibility of digital goods is 
currently shaping the next generation of Internet startups and technologies. 
For example, Capitol Records v. ReDigi266 examined whether an online 
marketplace committed primary and secondary copyright infringement for 
aiding customers in reselling their used MP3 files.267 ReDigi, the 
defendant, attempted to create a market for used MP3s by deleting each 
copy as it was being migrated for sale or transfer to ReDigi’s cloud 
service.268 By dint of deletion-upon-migration, ReDigi achieved a crude but 
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functional form of rivalrousness. 
To use the ReDigi market, consumers were required to download a 
local client.269 That client then ensured that any file that was uploaded to 
the ReDigi marketplace was deleted from the local hard drive. The local 
client also scanned the computer for illicit attempts to retain a copy of the 
sold file.270 The upload process used by ReDigi ensured that only one copy 
of the file was ever in existence before, during, or after upload for resale.271 
Once the song was uploaded to ReDigi’s cloud service, it could be resold 
without copying by merely changing which user had access to the uploaded 
copies.272 These elaborate precautions were necessary because the law of 
copyright posed a significant threat to the ability of a user to transfer their 
particular ownership in a single copy. This, indeed, was the result of the 
decision: the ReDigi court determined that a transfer of a digital object 
across the Internet could not be accomplished without creating a new and 
infringing copy.273 The court interpreted intellectual property law to ban an 
emerging technology that attempted to create discrete, rival rights in 
intangible assets. 
Particularly telling was the ReDigi court’s reliance on a United States 
Copyright Office report, which took express note of the debate over 
whether so-called “forward and delete” methods could create rival digital 
objects subject to traditional property rules.274 The report noted: 
Additionally, unless a “forward-and-delete” technology is employed to 
automatically delete the sender’s copy, the deletion of a work requires an 
additional affirmative act on the part of the sender subsequent to the 
transmission. This act is difficult to prove or disprove, as is a person’s 
claim to have transmitted only a single copy, thereby raising complex 
evidentiary concerns. There were conflicting views on whether effective 
forward and delete technologies exist today. Even if they do, it is not 
clear that the market will bear the cost of an expensive technological 
measure.275 
To the Copyright Office and the courts, the problem of copying 
intangibles appeared insoluble with then-extant technology. Courts 
therefore resolved the question in favor of copyright holders, forcing digital 
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assets back into the intellectual property mold. Yet even if the Copyright 
Office’s determination were correct at the time, it has been overtaken by 
technological development. 
The Copyright Office was concerned about copying and cost. Both 
concerns can be ameliorated by cryptologically sound ledgers. As above, 
duplication and double spending are two sides of the same coin. A user can 
no more spend a token in a block chain and keep it than she can give it to 
two different entities. Imagine a system in which the token acts as a key, 
permitting access to music streamed from a server. In this way, the music 
would not be duplicated by passing on the key to another user, permitting 
transfer without copying. While this form of duplication protection is not 
perfect, it does provide superior security to current solutions, at 
significantly lower cost. The technology outcompetes (especially on price) 
centralized technological measures such as rootkits, license servers, and 
other DRM traditionally employed by copyright holders. Thus, the cost 
prediction of the Copyright Office was incorrect. Block chain based ledgers 
strongly resist falsification, duplication, and double spending, and they do 
so at a cost low enough to support very high volume, low value 
transactions.276 
One can read cases like ReDigi as merely demonstrating judicial 
caution in the face of developing technology. Yet the concept of tangibility 
continues to exert influence across the board. For example, in a range of 
cases construing when a product developer may access computer code to 
build a product that is interoperable with another, the cases align nearly 
perfectly along the tangibility/intangibility axis. If a business wants to 
manufacture a universal garage door opener or television remote or 
refillable ink cartridge that avoids a printer manufacturer’s software 
restrictions, it may do so.277 If the product is entirely intangible, a 
combination of contractual restrictions, licensing rights, and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) can stop its development.278 The 
development of new digital produc ts and services requires that intellectual 
property make room for traditional ownership rights online without the 
physicality hook that has traditionally been required. 
 
 276. Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, 
Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 149 –50 (2014).  
 277. Molly Torsen, Note, Lexmark, Watermarks, Skylink and Marketplaces: Misuse and 
Misperception of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Anticircumvention Provision, 4 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 117, 120–22 (2004). 
 278. See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 637, 641–42 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
game developer whose employee clicked on a license agreement agreed to forego DMCA 
interoperability and reverse engineering protections). 
  
2015] BITPROPERTY 869 
3.  Establishing Block Chain Neutrality 
The prior two subparts have discussed problems within the common 
law (which prefers tangibility) and statutory framework (which 
overemphasizes intellectual property) that stand in the way of an 
operational digital property system. This subpart clears similar conceptual 
rubble from the perspective of potential regulators. This Article has 
attempted to demonstrate that trustless public ledgers can be put to a range 
of quite different uses. The danger is that block chain technologies as a 
whole may be cabined to one use case by the development of a specific 
legal regime, say, payments and money transmission services, and not left 
open to other potential uses. 
Block chain technology should be regulated based on how it is being 
used, not on an attempt to determine what the technology is. Multiple, 
completely separate use cases can coexist side-by-side on a single block 
chain. The block chain is neutral. It is simply a protocol for tracking 
information about rivalrous digital interests that provides a strong solution 
to the duplication problem without requiring a central curating authority. 
From the perspective of financial crimes enforcement, general law 
enforcement, and anti-money laundering or counter-threat-finance efforts, 
cryptocurrencies are a barely tolerable innovation because the technology 
can be used to transfer value among criminals.279 Under this view, 
regulators will work to reduce the fluidity and pseudonymity of trustless 
property systems. This is in response to many news stories describing the 
use of Bitcoin to purchase drugs, guns, or pornography.280 The approach is 
tinged with some new-technology hysteria, but has a serious point. There is 
no question that cryptocurrencies, like cash, will facilitate bad acts. The 
question is whether a ban or highly constraining regulation will do more 
harm than good.281  
There is a growing consensus that block chain technologies will be 
regulated.282 A multi-voiced discussion among regulating entities, industry, 
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consumer protection advocates, and legal academics is already taking 
shape.283 There is a strong case for careful regulation: almost all use cases 
for trustless technology stem from permitting people to trade something of 
value. Indeed, that is the purpose of trustless technology. Trading things of 
no value does not require a trustless system, since there is no problem of 
trust. 
Wise regulation of trustless technologies will take note of the multiple 
different use cases to which the technology can be put. It will avoid 
applying financial regulatory rules to startups that use the Bitcoin block 
chain for non-financial purposes. It will discriminate between value 
transfer systems, like property transfer registries, and financial use cases, 
like cryptocurrencies. It will sharply define the limits of rules that do cover 
financial use cases, so as to not impinge on co-extant non-currency uses. 
Finally, wise regulators will rapidly reevaluate and update rules as new use 
cases emerge. Although these updates will sacrifice some certainty, a 
humble, iterative, experimental approach to regulation will permit 
entrepreneurs to explore the technology for potential breakthrough uses. 
B.  CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES 
Whereas the prior section laid out pragmatic changes in the law that 
will be necessary to operationalize a true digital property system, this 
section will address conceptual counterarguments that challenge the theory 
advanced above. As proposed above, the essence of property is not things, 
not identity, not relationships, not sticks from the bundle, but information. 
As a corollary, property systems are information transfer and storage 
protocols. To this theory one might address several related criticisms, with 
which this section engages. 
1.  Is Information Separate from Property? 
A critic might first argue that while information about property is 
important, and while it should be communicated through secure networks 
and stored in secure facilities, this does not provide any support for the idea 
that the heart of property is information.284 The critic might strongly 
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differentiate between information about property and property itself. This 
conceptual move might be accompanied by a strong distinction between a 
physical, tangible thing and information about that thing. 
The proposition that property law sets up an information protocol does 
not merely concern information about property.285 Rather, the flow of 
property interests is itself information that percolates through human 
systems. Consider a fictitious tribe with an economy based on trades in 
shells.286 Those shells carry information, not just about the shells 
themselves, but about the goods and services one can command with those 
shells. The allocation of shells serves as a history of transactions. The 
shells serve as a social memory of all past deals.287 One might replace the 
shell system with a system in which an elder of the tribe with perfect recall 
must witness all transactions—that is, the shells serve as a substitute for a 
system in which there is perfect memory.288 In short, the property system 
and the information system are interchangeable. They are the same thing. 
Property is a way of recording the state of resource distribution in a 
society.289 It is not a catalog of all resources, but an information system 
designed to record the distributional decisions by which all members of the 
society are bound. Cash in a wallet is as much a record of resources at an 
individual’s disposal as is an entry in a bank account. Similarly, possession 
and ownership of a car serves as a record of the history of transactions that 
has caused that particular group of components to be assembled and 
brought to the point where it is parked in someone’s driveway and at their 
disposition. Property itself, its location, amount, possession and use, is thus 
an information system recording the current state of social resource 
allocation. Like the movement of beads of an abacus, the movement of 
property is itself information. 
2.  Is Information Subordinate to Property? 
Another potential contention might be that information is important to 
property, but is subordinate to some other characteristic. For example, a 
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critic might note that records—information—do not constitute definitive 
proof of ownership in many jurisdictions. If the record is proven to be 
incorrect, the “true” owner will prevail. One might conclude from this that 
information is subordinate to some other characteristic of property, and that 
the property interest does not reside in the data, but in some other feature of 
the thing itself, the transaction, or the relationship of the parties. 
This criticism significantly underestimates the primacy of information 
in property. A record of property ownership is only overturned on better 
information—better data—about who ought to be considered the actual 
owner. That is, there is no true, absolute owner. There is only the owner 
indicated by the best information that the legal system can access. While it 
is true that information about ownership stored in land records and verified 
by the procedures of the clerk’s office can be trumped by information 
stored in human minds (testimony) and verified by the procedures of the 
court during litigation, the question remains one of information. The owner 
is the entity to whom the best information points. The property right resides 
in the information. 
A similar challenge might arise from transfers of property by secret 
deed or private delivery of a gift. In such a transfer, the information about 
the transfer is not available to third parties, yet law seems to recognize the 
transfer. If property is an information transfer protocol, a critic might 
reasonably ask, how can it be that the legal system treats secret property 
transfers as valid? A response might be that the property right propagates 
as a function of information propagation. Consider information as ripples in 
a pond, spreading from the point of origin. As between the transferor and 
transferee, the secret transfer is effective. Consider again C, a non-party to 
the transaction, who learns about it from A or B. C promptly loses bona 
fide purchaser status upon hearing of the transfer. Wherever the 
information flows, it shifts the relationship of the parties with respect to 
one another and to the asset. 
3.  Is All Information Property? 
A final contention might be that conceptualizing property as 
information presses too far and implies that because property is a kind of 
information, all information is property. Such a criticism would, if correct, 
raise serious cause for concern with advocates for less propertization of 
information and for more access to knowledge. But the criticism would be 
inapt. Property is merely one kind of information system. All information 
cannot and should not be made into property, and that is not the contention 
of this piece. On the contrary, the approach suggested here demonstrates 
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that property is a special subcategory of information. Property is the subset 
of information systems that record transferrable, scarce, rival, persistent, 
and sharply delineated data objects. This holds for transfers of real estate, 
personal property, smart property, and digital property. Consider, for 
example, a proposed transaction in which someone wishes to sell a digital 
object—a bitcoin, a digital magic sword in a game, or a used MP3. A buyer 
will want to know whether the object is transferrable (Can the buyer 
actually obtain it from the seller?), persistent (Will it hold value?), rival 
(Can the seller retain a copy and resell it?), scarce (How hard is it for the 
buyer to obtain her own?), and sharply delineated (Are there clouds on 
title? Is there lack of clarity as to whether the asset is being bought or 
licensed?). Most information does not possess the characteristics of 
transferability, persistence, rivalry, scarcity, or delineation that are 
necessary for digital property rights. Such information should not be 
considered property. 
While all information is not property, all property is information. 
There is an important balance. Courts must not propertize non-rival and 
non-scarce information resources outside of the confines of the intellectual 
property system. Yet they must also learn to apply traditional property rules 
to scarce and rival intangible resources. There will be significant difficulty 
in finding the right balancing point and in calling close cases. Rivalry and 
scarcity are continuous, not discrete, variables. Assets can be more or less 
scarce, and more or less rivalrous. While easy cases like Bitcoin will fit 
smoothly into the law of property because of their clear scarcity and 
rivalry, hard cases will arise at whatever balancing point courts select. The 
existence of hard cases should not prevent courts from recognizing 
decentralized, rival, and scarce digital property interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Ledgers are the backbone of modern and sophisticated property 
systems. Such systems must keep track of millions of transactions worth 
trillions of dollars, must be kept up to date, must be accurate, and must be 
low-cost to maintain. Until recently, accomplishing this task without a 
centralized and trusted authority was not practical. As a result, property 
ledgers are split up among different verification authorities. They are hard 
to access, difficult to reach and search, and comparatively easy to 
manipulate or compromise. 
Block chain technologies promise significant gains in efficiency, 
certainty, and security over traditional methods of creating and tracking 
legal rights. They offer the possibility of decentralized and secure ledgers 
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to maintain digital property, currency, county land records, mortgage 
interests, security interests, stock ownership, and much more. Trustless 
public ledgers track transactions in real time, at comparatively low cost. 
The fact that ledgers are public means that they are available to anyone to 
track the flow of interests, permitting users to manage risk and monitor 
exposure. In online ecosystems, transaction costs are everything. The 
inability to track property interests cheaply has meant that property law has 
not yet come into its own online. With the advent of block chain 
technology, there is a serious chance it may do so. 
The invention of a decentralized property technology for intangibles 
offers an opportunity to reflect on the tortured history and uncertain future 
of digital property. Unlike electronic contracts or cybertorts, digital 
property is only now being born, after a long and hard labor. The core 
problem is that true digital rivalry and scarcity have been difficult to create, 
and the common law of property associates traditional property rules with 
tangible things rather than informationally compact data objects. As a 
result, courts have assumed that traditional property rules are simply 
inapplicable to online information-based resources, and have misapplied 
and overextended intellectual property law to fill the gap. 
What is needed, and what this Article has attempted to provide, is a 
theory of property as information. Property is not merely a system for 
constraining information costs by limiting form choice and modularizing 
clearly delineated packages of rights in things. Property is a system for 
formatting, transmitting, verifying, and securely storing information tying 
together identities, rights, and resources. Such an approach not only permits 
significant improvements on currently extant information cost theory, but 
also directly confronts the pernicious view that traditional property has no 
place online. Once the conceptual blocks that have prevented the full 
bloom of digital property online have been cleared away, the common law 
can put the cost savings and scaling effects of networked communications 
technologies to work to create an operational system of digital property. 
